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EDITORIAL

Readers of Theology are familiar with Mr. Robert H. Thouless's lucid and terse style in our pages, and will eagerly study his recently published book, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion.** They will not be disappointed. Its compactness renders it difficult to review with any justice, for it is packed with detail and illustration, and every paragraph tells. If we compare it with William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, we realize how much has been gained in fifteen years: psychology has adopted new and far-reaching classifications, and religious experience has shown itself to include far more than the abnormalities which were James's chief subject-matter. After defining religion as "a felt practical relationship with what is believed in as a superhuman being or beings," Mr. Thouless proceeds to discuss the five chief roots of religion in the human mind, distinguished respectively as the traditional, the natural, the moral, the affective, and the rational. Each is treated with admirable sympathy and understanding, and the criticisms of religion along the line of each are carefully considered.

The central chapters of the book (vii.–xi.) contain a clear account of the main principles of modern psychology, and of the relation of religion to the instinctive basis of man's life. Next come five chapters on particular phases of religious activity: the two on the different types of Conversion appeared in this Journal in 1920 and 1921. Finally, in a chapter entitled "General Considerations," Mr. Thouless addresses himself to the apologetic aspect of religious psychology—to the question of the validity of religious experience and the claim to explain it subjectively. The problem is really one, he says, of the worth of the empirical method as a guide to ultimate truth; but in so far as religious doctrines rationalize independent kinds of experience, we have no reason for not giving them the

* Cambridge University Press, 1923. 7s. 6d. net.

same weight as we give, *mutatis mutandis*, to the doctrines of science.

We trust that Mr. Thouless's book will be well and widely read. It possesses all the marks of a standard book.

It is a somewhat striking sign of the times that a Professor of Natural Science should write a book to show that the Incarnation is the " divine event " to which the whole course of evolution points. That is what Professor Simpson of Edinburgh has done in his *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*.* The book is solid and well documented, yet eminently readable, with well-chosen illustrations and diagrams, and an argument powerfully sustained to the end. We know no better statement of the scientific outlook with which men of to-day approach the problems of God, man, and the world.

Professor Simpson takes us through the whole story of man's evolution as the ascending hierarchy of sciences reveals it. The inorganic is not to be dismissed as of no consequence for man's ultimate questions and answers, since even here there are unmistakable signs of direction almost amounting to design. It seems as though the chemical elements themselves were in conspiracy to produce just such conditions as were indispensable if life and man were to thrive. If we consider the properties of matter, not statically, but in relation to time, and to what time brings forth, it becomes clear that " what we have to deal with in organism and environment is a single system undergoing change, the working up and out through that which is physical to that which is ultimately spiritual " (p. 13).

Yet the process is not smooth: it contains mutations, discontinuities, " lifts " which bring new relationships into ken. One such, for example, was the emergence of life; others are the various separations whereby the human stock was developed from the order of Anthropoidea; another the entry into the world of Jesus Christ. Yet the system remains one. " There are expressive points, movements whose implications are greater than their actual advent, increments, points after which everything moved upon a higher plane, but in every such change, transformation or epiphany, there is always something carried over from the previous stage. Life builds upon the basis of the inorganic elements; self-consciousness after all posits consciousness; Jesus is the Son of Mary " (p. 264).

* Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d. net.

May we say that this point of view gives a new significance to the genealogies of our Lord in the Gospels ?

What is the secret of these ages of evolution which have gone to the making of man ? Pithecanthropus—Neanderthal—Mousterian—Aurignacian—and all the other primitive bearers of gorgeous names—to what do they lead ? Professor Simpson (who tells the tale with such force and charm) concludes that the end and purpose is the winning of freedom. That pushfulness and self-assertion characteristic of all life, and the more so as its forms are higher, is the promise of an independence or individuality which shall raise the creature above not only his environment but himself. Self-mastery, self-determination is the essence of what man is meant to exhibit. And it depends on a new kind of relationship—the relationship to God. Hence freedom is fully achieved only in Love; for God is Love.

Professor Simpson does not care for the language of "the Fall"; but he has no doubt about the thing. Man's ethical part is a laggard compared with his intellectual and physical parts; they reach their term, but he as a whole does not. That is sin. Somewhere he has gone wrong, abused his freedom, and so developed in abnormal (*i.e.*, wrong) ways, and the result is an inward disharmony in conscience. Yet possibly there is more room here for the old story of Genesis than our author admits. When he says that "the conditions of the first moral act are possibly entirely unrepresentable to our minds to-day," he makes us ask whether it is not for precisely such a gap in our knowledge that the "myth" (as Plato taught) is framed, and whether there may not be an inspired myth such that at least it represents the truth better than any more logical concept.

The Incarnation, however, was not occasioned by the Fall: it is the natural climax and crown of evolution. We may say "natural" because (in Erigena's words) "Nature and Grace are one, the ways of Nature being manifestations of Grace, and Grace achieving its purposes through the eternal orderliness of Nature" (p. 270). On this point Professor Simpson is a thorough Westcottian. He is more. In his attitude to sin and its place in relation to the whole economy of redemption, he reproduces very closely that line of Christian thought which finds expression in the primitive Eastern liturgies.

For if the original purpose of God is complete self-communication to a being who can come into fellowship with Him, that purpose cannot be set aside by anything that man can do. Such a glorious manifestation

of His love as that which is seen in the Incarnation cannot be dependent on man's sin: in that case it makes man's sin necessary to it. It means that man merited less of God before " the Fall " than after it. In terms of some philosophies sin is a natural and necessary factor in the development of man's spiritual nature. On such a view it is difficult to see when it would cease to be necessary. On the contrary, sin is the deliberate refusal to accept the purpose of God in human life. It is at once treason to the world process as a whole and ingratitude to God: accordingly with the progress of knowledge sin deepens in character. But it has never changed the purpose of God: it only turns revelation into redemption. The source of the Incarnation is in the heart of God: baffled in one way, it finds expression in another. But this purpose has been the same from the beginning, although His methods of dealing with mankind may change. The Incarnation, then, is not dependent on " the Fall," for that would make it an afterthought. To think of it in the character of an emergency policy rather than as the natural development of the Divine purpose is to obscure its central and climactic place in human history (p. 312).

One could wish that, when our author had reached this point, he had stopped and handed over the remainder of his task to theology; for when he comes to critical and doctrinal questions, he is evidently not so expert. When, for example, he writes:

. . . it seems to follow from Luke i. 35 that the paternal relationship is associated with the Divine Power, indicated by the name Holy Spirit, rather than with the First Person of the Trinity,

he evidently forgets that the Greek word for " Spirit " is neuter, while its Semitic original is actually feminine; so that the passage is free from any kind of allusion to divine paternity, such as pagan myth abounded in. Again, Professor Simpson quite guilelessly advocates the Nestorian exegesis of Luke iii. 22, as though it had never been the storm-centre of a decisive controversy in the Church's history. Still, the value of Professor Simpson's book is not seriously lessened by these faults, if people will read it with care as well as good-will. That he should make out so convincing a case for the Incarnation, and for the new relationship which we call life in grace, as the crown of the cosmic process—this is the real significance of the book; and as this belief tends to substantiate itself more and more securely in scientific circles, we may see a greater readiness to recognize what Catholic theology has done of first-hand work upon that fact and that relationship, and a realization that no understanding of the *data* of religion is possible unless that work be very fully taken into account.

Canon Quick, whose Paddock Lectures* are briefly reviewed in this number, adumbrates an approach to the Incarnation

* *Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition.* Longmans. 1922.

not unlike that of Professor Simpson. Each level of being in the universe is organized by, and finds its meaning in, a higher —matter by soul or animate life, soul by νοῦς or spirit—so that we get the equation, " as man to matter, so God to man " (p. 120). Thus God, who is Love, is the unity and wholeness of human spirits. The New Testament word for the new relationship so constituted is ἀγαπή. The Word of God incarnates Himself in all Love, but supremely and uniquely in Christ. Does this mean that our Lord differs from other men in degree only, and not in kind ? Is He only One individual among others ? Canon Quick insists that our Lord is individual, but claims that the consequences of this view are not what is often feared. For in Christ the Word of God not only uniquely is, but also uniquely acts, and in the act discharges His whole Personality. On one side it might be said that Jesus differed in degree from other men; but on the side of action and its consequences, it is clear that no other has ever done what He did or could be imagined as so doing. The suggestion deserves attention.

John Forbes of Corse was one of the brilliant group of " Aberdeen Doctors " whose learning was so bright an ornament of the First Scottish Episcopacy (1610–1637). His most celebrated work—in Scotland, at least—was the *Irenicum*, the first Book of which will (we hope) shortly appear in English dress. But his greatest work, and the one that moved F. C. Baur to describe Forbes as the second most learned man in Europe in the seventeenth century, is the dogmatic " Summa" entitled *Instructiones Historico-Theologicæ*. Part of the eleventh Book of this work is now brought to notice in an English analysis by Dr. William Leslie Low, entitled *The True Catholic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*,* and preceded by a Memoir of Forbes.

The Memoir is based on Forbes's Diary or " Spiritual Exercises," and is well done; though in one respect Dr. Low is in error. There were, in all, three editions of the *Irenicum*, and it is in the third, not the second, that the evidences of Forbes's revising hand are so clear. The 1636 edition is, indeed, simply a reprint of that of 1629, with an altered title-page. The same year saw the publication of Gillespie's *Dispute against the English-Popish Ceremonies* and of the *Re-examination of the Perth Articles* attributed by the British Museum authorities to David Calderwood: and it was probably these two books which moved Forbes both to excise from, and to add to, the

* Edinburgh. The Scottish Chronicle Press, 1923.

earlier editions. This he did on his return to Scotland from the Netherlands in 1646, and left the work "ready for press" (*prælo paratum*) when he died.

As an *exposé* of John Forbes's Eucharistic doctrine, Dr. Low's analysis is useful but incomplete. In fact, we gather that his chief interest is in the criticism of Transubstantiation; for the very interesting early chapters, especially ch. iv. of the eleventh Book of the *Instructiones*, are omitted. The result is to do less than justice to Forbes's positive teaching, which, if it was typically Augustinian, yet embraced a very wide knowledge of patristic thought and doctrine. To gather the full *data* for this it would be necessary to consult the early chapters of *Irenicum*, Book I., and ch. xvi., part iv., of Book II. (on Adoration), together with the early chapters of *Instructiones*, Book IX. The result is a very impressive body of doctrine and one which, if it cannot entirely satisfy us to-day, can yet teach us much. Our own difficulties in connection with Reservation are not unlike some of those which Forbes had to deal with in his generation. This is not to say that we are not grateful to Dr. Low for his little book. Even as a mental discipline—and it is much more than that—Forbes's theology, written in strong, nervous Latin, amply repays study; and we hope that this volume will introduce many readers to the original.

Lady Barrett has done public service by the publication of a little book entitled *Conception Control*,* to which the Archbishop of Canterbury has added a Foreword. The subject is treated with reticence and reverence, knowledge and caution, and its tone is in marked contrast to that of the propaganda which it so impressively counters.

Those who have read the Abbot of Pershore's articles in our last issue and in this will be interested in the quarterly magazine which the Community have just launched under the title of *Laudate*. The magazine is attractively produced, and its contents suggest that it will fill a rôle of great value in the life of the English Church, as a real guide in ascetical theology. The price is one shilling quarterly, or four shillings and sixpence a year, post free.

* John Murray. 2s. net.

THE SECULARIZATION OF MORALS*

When the attention of Laplace, the "Newton of France," was called by Napoleon to the absence of any mention of God in the *Mécanique céleste*, he is said to have replied: "Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis." That Naturalism should thus usher God out of His Universe as an unnecessary hypothesis is but the logical outcome of its standpoint and premises, although in fairness to Laplace himself perhaps we ought to add that his dying words were "Ce que nous connaissons est peu de chose, ce que nous ignorons est immense."

That the exit of God, however, should be followed in due course by the exit of the Good is not perhaps at first sight a necessity. That a treatment of morals is possible without any reference to their supposed sacred origin or supernatural sanction has long been recognized, and is again assayed in the book before us. Perhaps, if Mr. Laing were challenged, he would adopt the defence of the French astronomer, and maintain that Ethical theory need not appeal either to the hypothesis of the deity or that of the absolute Good, there being no necessity for any such propositions in the search for a solution of Ethical problems. In any case we have in this book an earnest attempt to give an intelligent account of human action without resort to supernatural supports and sanctions, and to offer a solution of Ethical difficulties without an appeal to the supposed existence of any moral categorical imperative or authoritative Moral Absolute.

If Kantian Ethics are in the true line of descent from Augustinianism, which itself founds upon the Biblical conception of Human Nature and sin, Mr. Laing's treatment of Ethical problems reveals the extent to which philosophical ethics have diverged from the Christian concepts since Kant's time. The divorce between religion and morality could not be more convincingly shown than in a treatment of Ethical problems in which the word God hardly occurs and in which the conception of sin in the Christian sense is scarcely mentioned. The new Ethic has no need of any such hypotheses.

If there are still some who feel, as Herbert Spencer felt, that once morals are divorced from their supposed sacred origin they are in danger of disappearing, they may take heart of grace in perusing Mr. Laing's volume. He, at any rate, does not share their fear. If, when the supernatural supports and sanctions of morals are swept away, there is a danger of men

* *A Study in Moral Problems.* B. M. Laing. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922. 10s. 6d. net.

supposing that there are no moral standards and sanctions, the fear is groundless because in this enlightened age fresh reserves of moral sanctions can be brought up from the camp of Evolution and Science; rules of right conduct can be established on a scientific basis. Herbert Spencer's effort, which in his own words was " to present moral rule in that attractive aspect which it has when it ceases to be disturbed by superstition and asceticism," will be crowned by success when we have discovered how to control the conditions of morality. If (to quote Mr. Laing's view of the problem) " morality turns upon the possibility of controlling natural processes in virtue of a knowledge of the conditions of these processes," THEN, " the problem confronting human action is to control these processes so that they are made to subserve the realization and preservation of moral values."

No assumption apparently of a tendency to evil on the part of individual human beings is necessary. The source of evil is to be sought in objective conditions. " Evil," we learn, " has primarily its source in objective factors or conditions, and only secondarily does it appear to be a quality of desire. It originates in the struggle for means to desired and desirable ends; and this struggle itself originates in the fact that the conditions of life in part created by human activity set men in opposition to each other " (p. 232).

In Mr. Laing's treatment we find the traditional view of morality as a control of the instincts and desires by reason or by the will rejected (p. 238). Defects in moral action and in motive are due to defects in conditions, not to defects in an inner will (p. 245). Thus to make the good life actual, it is not necessary to await an inner change of will on the part of mankind, but to discover the conditions on which the realization of values depends, and on the basis of such knowledge to construct a mechanism which will render the realization of moral values certain (p. 255). Hence we are to believe that the control of conditions in particular, based on scientific knowledge, will liberate the higher qualities of man (p. 274).

Thus the close relation between natural processes and morality and the consequent possibility of a solution of the moral problem by means of control based on the results of science is the central theme and is elaborated in closely-reasoned chapters of the book before us.

The problem of the relation between human action and natural law, the reconciliation between the freedom implied in morality and the rigidity and uniformity of natural law is fundamental because, as our author sees quite clearly, " it lies at the basis of all the more specific moral problems like evil,

social conflicts, conflicts of values, the instability and uncertainty of moral progress and moral achievement; and because its solution will point a way to a solution of these difficulties." Mr. Laing recognizes the metaphysical implications involved in this question, the structure of the universe, the nature of reality, the meaning of natural causality and natural conditions. He is fully conscious of the objections which have been urged against the possibility of beginning with cause and of working up to purpose.

> The disparateness of natural cause and moral purpose, of natural law and moral law, renders such a procedure impossible. There is an insuperable difficulty in effecting a transition from laws which describe how things and people do act to laws which describe how people should act. The one type of law cannot be derived from the other. Ethics, in consequence, can never be purely inductive; and there remains a fundamental distinction between ethics and the inductive sciences.

All this Mr. Laing recognizes, but he sets himself to question these propositions and assumptions. He proposes a new way of approach by which he seeks to give what he thinks is a very intelligible account of human action and to obtain a clear explanation of many moral difficulties.

What is this new approach ? The common assumption, as he points out, is that Ethics sets up moral standards or norms. This assumption, he thinks, is the cause of difficulties for Ethical method and it hampers Ethical enquiry. It hinders, in his opinion, the solution of most difficulties by prejudging how and where a solution is to be found. The new approach is to allow the enquirer to seek a solution amongst a material that is likely to be more fruitful. Mr. Laing finds the solution in this idea of control based on the results of science.

> The element of control or regulative power (he tells us) is already present in human action; and moral theory has not to create it. What Ethics has to do is to interpret that element of control and to express its nature in formulæ. Its task, accordingly, does not differ from the task of any positive science; it would do so only if it had to create a standard or control or to impose a formula upon human action.

The problem, then, is the origin of moral and spiritual values. Are these absolute and independent of human action and conduct, or are they a product of it ? Again, is it necessary to solve moral problems only in moral terms, in terms of moral fact ? If Ethical investigation is purely inductive, which, it is urged, must be a *sine qua non* of a *science* of human action at all, then no obligation to a solution of moral difficulties in moral terms need be felt. Why ? Because " for purposes of explanation [we are told] every positive science is continually expressing one fact in terms of a different type of fact—colours

in terms of waves, things in terms of atoms, atoms in terms of electrons." Why not, then, morals in terms of the non-moral? Is this merely a descriptive process? No, because science, in doing so, is doing something more than merely describing the qualities or properties of things; "it is stating that one kind of phenomenon with certain characteristics arises or comes to be when certain factors or conditions of quite a different character are present."

Those familiar with Professor Alexander's Gifford Lectures ("*Space, Time, and Deity*") will recognize at once the standpoint from which an approach to Ethical problems is suggested. We are to apply *the philosophy of emergence* to the sphere of Ethics and explain "moral values" as "arising" in certain conditions and complexities of natural processes in social and political life. Given a certain complexity of social structure certain "values" arise. Under other conditions, presumably other "values" will appear, and so on. There is, then, no absolute standard or norm given once for all, but a purely relative ethic, adapted to, and, if you like, "emerging" from or created by, the social conditions and the particular civilization of the period.

Mr. Laing in his exposition is careful to avoid the causal suggestiveness of the word "emerges," and so expresses his thought in a more colourless phrase, "arises."

The word "arises" or "comes to be," he tells us, is purposely used because it is somewhat colourless and raises no question about the "how" at the moment; and for these reasons is more suitable than the terms "produced by" or "emerges," because of their implications and the divergent theories which they presuppose. (*Cf.* also pp. 106-9.) But apart from any questions of phraseology, Mr. Laing is bidding us approach the Ethical problem from the empirical and scientific standpoint. We must not, however, be content simply with description and enumeration of various features of morality or moral conduct, various rights and duties; we must pass on to the discussion of the conditions of morality.

If, then, Science presents us with the phenomenon of qualities of one order leading to the existence of qualities of a different order, why should not "values" arise on the basis of factors different from "values"? It is not a doctrine of the evolution of the moral from the non-moral, but simply the fact from observation that, given a certain complexity of structure, "qualities" emerge. Why they should do so is not the point. The fact that they do so is all that the empirical philosopher is concerned to point out. So in ethical theory. If "values are not existences like objects that have a spatial

limit, but are qualities attaching to things, actions, and human beings," then these values may be observed as present in the course of human activity and can be traced in the course of human history. An inductive method of Ethics is concerned to examine the course of human conduct under varying circumstances, to discover what are the conditions necessary at any given time for the " emergence " of certain Ethical values. A knowledge of conditions necessary should lead to a power of control. If a certain complexity of civilized life in the past reveals the presence of values of a certain kind, the question of the *origin* of these values is to some extent answered by the presence of certain conditions of morality, which presumably have given rise to these particular moral values, and accounts also for the prevalence of certain moral problems and perplexities.

Such seems to be the line of thought, and it brings us to the real crux—the question whether morality does rest on conditions. If so, an enquiry into the conditions ought to explain how the difficulties have arisen. Why rights and duties are not realized in actual life is to be answered by an enquiry into the conditions. This enquiry should reveal to us both how the difficulties have arisen and also how they can be removed.

One of the chief characteristics of Mr. Laing's treatment of moral problems is his vivid realization of the pressing character of present social conflicts and problems of industry, the burden of social life, and the need of some solution of the Ethical problem which will bring relief to our modern civilization and reveal a method of treatment adequate to cope with the serious neurotic symptoms so clearly discernible in our present social system. How can man free himself from the sense of moral failure and the crushing burden which morality seems to impose upon him ? Will not an examination of the conditions of morality—apart from any *a priori* dogmatic assumptions about the depravity of human nature, the evil tendency of the human heart, the existence of a Moral Lawgiver, and a categorical imperative to follow an absolute Good—show clearly that Ethical theory must go hand in hand with natural processes and adapt itself to these ? If the root cause of man's moral failure is not to be sought in his will, does it lie in the relation between natural processes and human action ? If human beings are natural organisms, then, like other types, they must be subject to natural causation. The very complexity of the conditions of human life impose upon man " a burden which no other type of animate existence has to bear." " It is [so our author tells us] a tragic destiny for man if progress means an inevitable bearing of such a burden." Is it inevitable ? If it can be

shown that "the burden which mankind at present bears is not ultimately a creation of human wills, but has its origin in the operation of causal factors," then "no will, however moral it is, can influence natural processes by adhering to moral sentiments and enunciating moral dicta; all the moral resolutions passed by even the most august bodies and all the moral enthusiasm embodied in leagues and societies are powerless to affect natural chains of causation." We must look elsewhere for a solution. We must abandon our belief in human will as the origin of human good and human evil; we can tell men that there is no need for them to believe that their difficulties are really due to a supposed tendency to evil on their part; they need not be oppressed by the belief that they are endowed with desires that lead to evil, nor need they be depressed by the question why they should seek evil and what is contrary to their own welfare. We can teach them that the true solution of their difficulties is not in themselves, but in objective factors and conditions which can be controlled. The solution of the moral problem can be stated in terms other than moral. It can be found in the relation between morality and natural processes. Mr. Laing's thesis is—

> that values constitute one order of real qualities but not the sole order of real qualities; and for that reason it is impossible to interpret reality purely in terms of value, to apply moral predicates to the universe as a whole, or to regard the realization of moral values as inevitable. From the standpoint of morality the task of man is to liberate these qualities from the admixture of other elements, from the complexity of the real, and to create a sphere wherein exist the conditions to sustain these qualities.

He is careful, moreover, to show that the fact that there is a relation between morality and natural processes must not be understood to mean that natural processes are to be allowed to pursue their course in morality as, for example, in the case of natural selection; on the contrary, "man has to control natural processes so as to evolve in spite of and out of their mutually conflicting results the values of morality."

He believes that much of our inability to solve moral problems like the conflicts of claims, the conflict of egoism and altruism, the conflict between the duties and rights of the individual and the duties and rights of the community, the perplexing problem of evil and other Ethical puzzles, is due to the failure in Ethics to realize this relation between morality and natural processes. He gives a striking illustration of this by reference to natural selection (p. 12, *cf.* p. 147 ff., p. 160 ff.):

> Human association gives an additional value to human life; but somehow in actuality man has been denied, or deprived of, that value

The reason is that, in spite of all moral theory about the elimination of the influence of natural selection from human life, it has not been eliminated; and it has not been eliminated because the struggle for existence is still keen within social life; and the struggle for existence is keen because of the conditions arising from the uncontrolled operation of natural processes. And this is true in spite of all the scientific and economic development of modern times. The demand for rights, the growing insistence upon rights, and even the nature of rights can be explained by reference to this struggle for existence. They are utilized as a defence in the struggle; and moral theory has dealt with rights and duties without being fully aware that its conclusions derived their significance from a condition of things which involved a struggle for existence, and that, if the struggle for existence were eliminated from human life, these conclusions might have to be revised.

We must leave our readers to deduce for themselves the full implications of this line of argument. Space will not permit us to follow Mr. Laing's treatment of values and causes in Chapter III., though it is here and later on more particularly in Chapter IV., on the relation between moral values and the psychological nature of man, that the point of divergence between his treatment of Ethical problems and that of the Christian Theist becomes more clearly marked. The extent of that divergence culminates in Chapter X., where the full implications of seeking the source of evil in objective conditions are revealed, notably in Section 5, the treatment of cases of deliberate evil and maliciousness, and Section 6, the case of the criminal.

Nowhere throughout the book is the Christian Ethic attacked in so many words, but the whole treatment of Ethical problems in Mr. Laing's hands cuts across the Christian conception and is radically opposed to it on specific points.

We should contend that Christianity is opposed to the philosophy of emergence whether in its metaphysical or its Ethical application. "Values" are not the product of human conduct but the producer of it. Far from these moral values "emerging" from or even "arising" with the growth and complexity of civilized life, they are the creative factors of it. Human action, we should maintain, does not determine the values, but the values are determinative of it and by them it is judged. The moral imperative is not a product of an ever-advancing civilization and an evolutionary progress; it possesses absolute authority in its supernatural origin, and is transcendent above human life and conduct as the *sine qua non* of its being immanently effective in it. Evolutionary Ethical theory may deny this, but the Christian teaching is bound up with the conception of God as Himself the source and embodiment of the Moral Ideal for man. Ethics and Religion are

indissolubly united, and man is viewed as realizing his true end to the extent to which he is loyal to the dictates of the Divine within him, whilst his moral failure is measured by just that distance between the "ought" of God's command and the refusal of human disobedience.

In the Christian conception intrinsic moral values belong to persons only. They are of the very texture of reality, objectively real as well as subjectively realized in individual lives. This subjective realization, however, is not the creation of these values. The very endeavour of the individual to strive after the Ideal or the recognition by the individual, in conscience, of the sense of obligation, presupposes the existence of a moral and spiritual standard or norm and at the same time the presence of an absolute authority which is itself the explanation of the sense of obligation and without which that sense would not exist.

Christianity postulates the existence of an ideal *summum bonum*, a moral order objectively real and transcendent. This in the last analysis is conceived of as quite independent of our human approximation to it or repudiation of it. It is not of our creation. It is independent of our acceptance or rejection of it. It is, in short, embodied in God Himself, the witness of whose Presence in human life is the moral imperative.

The crux of the moral problem is, of course, the apparent lack of congruity between the natural order and the moral order. In the one we have the realm of causation, in the other the realm of ends. The laws governing both seem to diverge in the results produced. Nature appears indifferent to moral values and the categorical imperative demands the production of ideals against which much in the natural order seems directly opposed. A harmony between these two orders, the natural and the moral, is the quest of a philosophical ethic. Now Professor Pringle Pattison has reminded us that—

> the real postulate or implied presupposition of ethical action is simply that we are not acting in a universe which nullifies our efforts, but that morality expresses a fundamental aspect of reality, so that in our doings and strivings we may be said, in a large sense, to have the universe somehow behind us. Moral action, in short, implies the belief in a moral order, just as deliberate action of any sort implies belief in the orderly connectedness of physical nature (*The Idea of God*, p. 35).

In the Christian Ethic we have the thought of this world as the sphere for the achievement of an Ethical task on the part of men made in the image of God. We have the Ideal as the kingdom of God, but first and last in the achievement of this Ideal is the Holy Spirit as a moral dynamic, a *creative power*

in human life. Entrance to the kingdom is by the way of a "new birth," a reorientation of the whole man from self to God. The essential features of the Christian Ethic have been clearly summarized by D. Mackenzie [in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Article "Ethics and Morality" (Christian)] in which he points out that—

> "what is needed to initiate Christian morality is not ethical synthesis (Plato), or discipline (Aristotle), or inhibitive control (Stoics), or culture (Goethe), or development (Spencer), or "the fulfilment of a capability given in human nature itself" (Green), but Creation."

There we have the secret and the answer to the question as to how man can set about the attainment of the Christian character and become a worthy citizen of a realm of Ends. How is the race of man to embody in itself the Kingdom of God? Ethical systems which throw man back upon his own resources fail to grip the real issue at stake—viz., man's essential weakness and the facts of human sinfulness and man's lack of power. Man's need is God's opportunity, and the Christian Ethic is bound up with the Christian Revelation and the work of Christ. From this follows the distinctive vitality of the Christian life of faith in which is revealed a moral creative Power, so that, as Professor Mackenzie says, "the history of Christian morality is thus a record of how the Spirit of Christ has been endeavouring to redeem all life to its own service, and the record is still unfinished."

And again:

> the end of Christian virtue is to be a perfect man in Christ, to live with a sure hold of the world of values which Christ revealed and to convert those values into reality. Its great means of subsistence and progress is prayer. . . . [Prayer is] the Spirit of God recreating man in God's image, and the work of man's spirit working out his own salvation. . . . The Christian ideal is, individually viewed, eternal life, and for all men, organically viewed, the Kingdom of God.

Such, in briefest outline, is the Christian standpoint in Ethical theory. It is bound up with belief in the continuous presence in human life of a life-giving, grace-bestowing, sin-conquering superhuman Personality with whom men can become united by faith and by this union are introduced into a new world of moral values and a new experience of redemption and regeneration. Any Ethical achievement by a Christian is in his belief an achievement through the Grace of God. Thus, whilst Christian Ethics may possess no message and value for the Pelagian man, to whom salvation by culture or growing knowledge may make a powerful appeal, yet it has a message

for sinners still, who know their state and feel their need. Professor Mackenzie is right when he reminds us that—

> Christian moralists are coming to see that the Christian life is bound up with the Christian revelation, and that the ideas of philosophic Ethics or historical theories must not be used so as to crush out the distinctive vitality of the Christian life of faith.

If the spread of modern Pelagianism in the West means in the future a still wider breach between Ethical theory and Christianity; if more and more men come to look for salvation by other methods than Christian conversion and the moral dynamic of the Holy Ghost as the recreator of human lives; if they put their trust in evolutionary Ethics and social reconstructions divorced from religious sanctions; then indeed we may hope to see a new civilization arising on the ruins of the present which, with all its faults and imperfections, has at least the claim to have been built up upon Christian ideas, and to some extent, at any rate, has been shaped by Christian ideals. What the form of the new civilization which is to replace it will be is a question upon which it would be, perhaps, unwise to speculate. If it is to be founded upon the natural *goodness* of man; if its ideal is a social Utopia and its progress is to be measured by the extent to which the new gospel of comfort is to find realization amongst its members; if its citizens in the third and fourth generations are to have had the last relics of the old religion and Ethical superstitions about the badness of man and the moral depravity of human nature *bred out of them* and with this breeding out, presumably, will vanish also the sense of shame and the feeling of sin; we can, perhaps, dimly imagine the sort of society which the future holds in store for us. What we are glad to think is that it will not be OUR lot to have to minister to such a generation or to reason with it on the subject of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come.

In the good and godless times which may lie before us, if the Christian Ethic disappears, we can only hope that things may be a little better than the state of Russia to-day to which we all owe a real debt for having at so great a cost given us a demonstration by way of experiment of what a Socialist Utopia can really be. We hope that our gloomy foreboding of the full consequences of a complete secularization of morals will never be realized, and we base it upon our belief that, in spite of all that philosophers and scientists may tell him to the contrary, man's own conscience will still witness to him of his real state and drive him in his need back to that God who, however unnecessary a hypothesis He may appear to be for

philosophical Ethics, is a very real necessity in human need and a very ready help in time of trouble.

In conclusion, we should like to say that whilst in reading Mr. Laing's treatment of Moral Problems we have found ourselves frequently in disagreement with his solutions, yet we value his work not least because he forces us to realize the complexity and difficulty of the problems discussed, and also because he reveals the full strength of the arguments which can be urged against the Christian view in the light of modern thought and the bewildering complexity of modern social problems. A careful perusal of his closely-reasoned pages will amply repay the readers of this study in Moral Problems.

H. Maurice Relton.

FORMAL CREEDS AND REUNION

At the various conferences which have been held within recent months in connection with "Faith and Order," the question has been debated between representatives of different Christian Churches and societies: "*What degree of unity in faith will be necessary in a reunited Church?*"

It may be assumed that there is a general consensus among Christians, who accept the idea of a reunited Church, that any such unity can only be based upon essentials, and that the essentials of such a faith, if defined at all, must be defined in *minimum*, not *maximum*, terms. How, then, can such a *minimum* be defined? What is the proper method of approaching the problem in view of the actual situation that exists? Is such a definition necessary or desirable at all?

For my own part I am persuaded that such a definition is both necessary and desirable. There is, I know, a body of Christian opinion, which includes some very influential names, that is opposed to the authoritative formulation of any Creed by the Christian society. Christianity, it is urged, does not consist essentially in the acceptance of a body of beliefs, but in loyalty to a Person. It is fundamentally a life to be lived, not a creed to be believed. All who are loyal to Jesus Christ should be allowed to share in the Christian fellowship without being asked or compelled to define their beliefs. The practice of the Church from early times, it is urged, has been wrong.

It is maintained that any enforcement of belief as a condition of communion leads to unreality and violates the rights of conscience. What a man believes, so it is said, is a matter between himself and God. There is intrusion on the sacred secrets of his heart if he is asked to define what he holds; there is tyranny, the more cruel because it concerns

the spirit, if he be excluded from communion unless he explains what he thinks. To require catechumens, as a condition of receiving Baptism, to affirm the brief Creed of the second century, to insist on bishops, if they are to retain their sees, accepting the Nicene conciliar decree, to forbid reception into the Church unless the Creed of Pope Pius IV. is professed as a statement of belief, are only differing degrees of the same injustice.*

Creeds and confessions of faith, moreover, have been a fruitful source of dissension and division among Christians. Therefore, so it is urged, any authoritative definition of belief is both undesirable and unnecessary.

This position may be summed up not unjustly, perhaps, in the well-known lines of Pope:

For creeds and forms let senseless bigots fight,
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.

In answer to these objections it may be urged:

(1) It may be doubted whether any Christian society has ever existed at any time without holding some beliefs in common. Certainly the earliest community of Christians held such a body of beliefs. It may be possible for very small societies to cohere without defining these beliefs. But in such case they are implicitly assumed and instinctively acted upon. These conditions, however, could not exist in a world-wide Church. What happened in the early Christian communities, as they began to develop, was that the implicit beliefs were impugned, and the Church had to make up its mind as to their essential validity. The Church, in order to safeguard essential truths, was forced to define what was essential.

(2) The point of view represented by those who would reject any form of authoritative creed is a fact which cannot be ignored. It has something valid behind it. What is this something?

I think it represents a protest against over-definition. The dangers of over-definition are obvious, and may be richly illustrated from the course of Christian History. Whether it be the definitions of the Council of Trent, or the elaborate confessions of Faith drawn up by the various Reformation Churches, one result inevitably follows. Such efforts tend to disunion, and a narrowing and impoverishing of the Christian fellowship. There is a tendency to confuse the less important and the more important, to draw no distinction between what is essential and what is not. This danger, it must frankly be acknowledged, exists; but I venture to think that it can be guarded against quite adequately if we steadily bear in mind

* Dr. Darwell Stone in the *Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1912, p. 37 ("The Creeds and Modern Movements").

two things: (*a*) that any form that can be adopted by a reunited Church must be one that makes its appeal to the largest body of Christian people—it must be a bond of union in the widest possible sense; and (*b*) it must contain only essentials.

There is one other point that requires some comment. The antithesis between creed and life is fundamentally unsound. A credal form or Confession may be a collection of lifeless dogmas which have lost all vital significance and appeal. Dogmas sometimes perish of inanition. But even so they once pulsated with life and meaning. And, of course, it is true that no formula of belief has any power or value apart from life. But all traditional credal forms are not devoid of life; some, indeed, by their history and authority and appeal, may be regarded as fundamental expressions of the Faith of the one undivided Church, which is still adequate, even though viewed in a larger setting of faith and knowledge, to the needs of the Church universal.

Dr. Skrine in his Bampton Lectures has emphasized, in eloquent and arresting language, this aspect of the matter. He insists that the things connoted by the Catholic Church—"Catholic Creed, Catholic sacramental system, Catholic order"—depend upon "the indwelling of Christ or of the Spirit of Christ," and that without this they would inevitably wither and die. "All these things," he says, "come out of the truth that catholicity is life." Dealing with the use of the historic Catholic Creeds, he says:

> Some Christians . . . plead that the existing language of the two longer creeds is that of a superseded metaphysic, and where not out of date is out of the comprehension of most worshippers; that there are articles even in the simplest formulary which are no longer held true in their original sense; and at least one article the historic validity of which some of the faithful cannot affirm with the old absolute assurance; that in consequence the use of the creeds in public worship is an inconvenience, or even for some consciences a mischief, and that it would be well to discontinue their use. This plea, Dr. Skrine continues, should be met neither with anger nor even with disrespect. These protesters against creed are still entangled in the error that faith is of the mind, and that creed helps faith by its work upon the intelligence. But it is the soul to which creed has to minister by words which best can stir the life-movement in that soul towards union with the divine realities symbolized. These words must be ancient words, carrying the continuity and catholicity of the Church, if they are to carry the spell of a communion with a faith which was and is to be. Their fixity has inconvenience; their mutability would have mischief. What unthrift it would be to exchange the power on heart and will which flows out in the echo of the catholic watchwords for some slight gain of appeal to the intelligence. A gain too so easily recoverable. For, as in the secular commonwealth, we readjust the misfits worked in its statutes through time and change by the

instruments of equity which reinterprets letter by spirit, or by the silent abrogation of a letter that is dead; so the laws of the spiritual commonwealth can be revitalized, if need call for it, by the consent, tacit or overt, of clerus and populus to let the statute stand indeed unchanged, but stand for a new and better apprehension of the truth. . . . The practice of reinterpreting a creed in any member of it which has suffered the touch of mortality, from which no speech of man is immune, is a catholic practice; it need stir no alarm or scruple in those who have the catholic mind.*

Dr. Skrine is referring to the historic Creeds, more especially to the Apostles' and "Nicene" Creeds. But what he has said will apply to a single formulary such as the "Nicene" Creed, which has behind it the authority and acceptance of the whole undivided Church to an extent that no other credal form shares.

Before we come to consider the positive arguments for the acceptance by the reunited Church of a credal form, there is one other body of Christian opinion which must be referred to with all respect, and which objects to the use of Creeds in general. I refer to those Christians who accept the maxim "The Bible and the Bible only," and would urge this as a sufficient basis for unity in a reunited Church. Now I think it may be affirmed confidently that such a basis has never been found in practice to conduce to Christian unity; and it never could. The Bible must be interpreted, and distinctions must be drawn between what is of primary importance and what is of secondary value if it is to be a guide of life. Christ Himself set the example of the right method when He summed up the essence of the Law as love of God and love of one's neighbour. These distinctions must be drawn, and will in practice be drawn, either on the authority of some revered teacher, or body of teachers, or a Church. Sooner or later the enlightened and instructed sense and conscience of the community must assert itself against the extravagances of mere unrestrained and uninstructed private judgment.

I suppose that in no department of religious thought has it become more necessary to revise what had, especially since the Reformation, come to be the traditionally and popularly accepted view than in our estimate of the Bible. In the light of modern knowledge the dogma of verbal inspiration has become absolutely untenable. Not all parts of Scripture can any longer be put on exactly the same level. Distinctions are drawn between what is primary and what is secondary. The revelation enshrined in the Bible is seen to be progressive. In particular the fundamental and primary importance of the prophetic literature in the history of the religion of Israel is now seen to be supreme. And this vital factor is also decisive

* *Creed and the Creeds*, p. 199*f*.

in our conception of New Testament religion. The new knowledge has certainly revolutionized many cherished older views, and fundamentally changed the old point of view. But nowhere, it seems to me, has there been a more impressive vindication of the old traditional creed of the Church. In none of the Catholic formularies that possess anything like Œcumenical authority is there any attempt to define precisely in what inspiration consists. Verbal inspiration and the inerrancy of Holy Scripture is not a dogma of the Catholic Church. All that the Church affirms as an article of faith on the subject is contained in the clause of the Nicene Creed: "I believe in the Holy Ghost who spake by the prophets." And what more adequate or satisfying assertion on the subject could be devised? Surely this is a convincing example of the divinely illuminated consciousness of the Church when she is constrained to affirm her faith authoritatively and as a united and truly Catholic Body. But the case for the necessity and desirability of an authoritative credal formulary in a reunited Church may be stated in a broad constructive way, and fortified by arguments of a positive and far-reaching kind. We have first of all to ask ourselves, What is our aim? It is, is it not, to recover in a reunited Christian Church something of the lost unity of Christendom. We are trying to recover something which Christians once possessed, but have for many centuries lost, a Body which may be identified throughout the world as the One Catholic and Apostolic Church. How real this corporate life of the one society was in its earliest phases has been admirably expressed in some words I will venture to quote: "Ask every heathen emperor of the first three centuries; ask every heathen writer who deigns to mention the Christians; what they saw with fear and aversion, what they waged war with to the death, was not an opinion, or a cult, or a set of principles, but a Society which held all together, which had its officers and its passwords, which seemed to threaten the security of the State, just because it was coherent and corporate, which seemed to them (who knew not the distinction between civil and religious) an *imperium in imperio*."* Such was the Catholic Church in its vigorous youth; and though, as conditions changed, and the governing power exchanged hostility for patronage, the Church lost some of its compact and independent life, it still retained much, and remained unmistakably one society. It is something of this lost unity that we are striving to regain. The vision of a reunited Catholic Church of Christ has captivated the imagination especially of the younger generation. But it is obvious

* *Cf.* R. Winterbotham, *The Kingdom of Heaven*, p. 37. (Cited from *Tertullian.*)

that if we are to do anything towards realizing the vision, we must put ourselves in line with the facts of history.

Now among the most impressive facts and achievements of the old Catholic Church is the formulation of the Œcumenical Creed. This was the result of no mere accidental or trivial causes, but represents the outcome of centuries of theological thinking and controversy, and is one of the most majestic and impressive of the achievements of the United Church. There has been no lack of creeds, confessions, and theological formulas of various kinds produced by Christian societies both ancient and modern. All that is best in this long and painful travail is summed up in the Œcumenical Creed that we call the Nicene. A common confession of the faith once delivered to the saints is necessitated by the genius and age-long experience of the Church. There can be no recovered unity in Christendom without it. Any reunion between East and West, not to speak of the more important of the organized Churches which are the fruit of the Reformation, would be inconceivable except on the basis of a common confession of faith.

So vast and varied an organism as the Reunited Church would be must have a common basis of accepted belief if it is to possess any coherence at all. This must, of course, be confined to absolute essentials. As the Lambeth Conference of 1908 solemnly declared: "Without the historic Creed the ideas would evaporate into unsubstantial vagueness, and Christianity would be in danger of degenerating into a nerveless altruism."

For it is clear that, to use Dr. Headlam's words, "the only Christian reunion that is possible is the reunion of that Christianity which is commonly designated as orthodox—a reunion on the basis of belief in the Incarnation and the Trinity." And this belief is expressed in language which all who are loyal to historic Christianity can accept in the Œcumenical Creed.

The acceptance of such an orthodox statement of the faith, as expressing the fundamental belief of the reunited Church, does not mean that all questions must be regarded as finally settled so far as the Church is concerned. A sane and sober orthodoxy is fully compatible with the largest freedom of thought and discussion. Theology if it is to live must constantly re-construct itself and re-interpret the ancient faith in the light of new knowledge and the problems of the age in which we live. But all this can be done, and should be done, by Christian theologians on the basis of the historic Creed. The theology that is so based will doubtless assume different forms in different circles. There will be conservatives and liberals, and conservative and liberal systems of theology. There will be controversy, criticism, and doubtless conflict, as there was in the

ancient Catholic Church. This is the price of freedom, and it is only in the atmosphere of real freedom of discussion and debate in theological matters that the truths of the creed can live and assert their power. When discussion and debate have defined some particular issue the Church as a whole can decide, authoritatively if need be, how much of what is new can be assimilated without obscuring the fundamental truths which it cannot abandon without disloyalty to the testimony of its own consciousness and religious experience—that Jesus is Redeemer and Lord, and that in His Life and whole and complete and perfect humanity is to be seen the supreme revelation of God to man. These fundamental truths of the Christian consciousness are safeguarded in the Œcumenical Creed.

At the same time, the whole-hearted acceptance of the Creed is not inconsistent with the enjoyment of a large amount of liberty of thought. I think two examples will illustrate my meaning. Dr. Rashdall, in his paper read at the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen, sets forth a reconstructed theology which he claims is consistent with the Creeds, and is in harmony with orthodox theology in its doctrine of God. Personally, I could not commit myself to the acceptance of this reconstruction, but I feel that Dr. Rashdall's claim and desire to be loyal to the historic Creed is to be welcomed with enthusiasm. On such lines progress all round ought to be possible. Then, to take another example, in Dr. Relton's *A Study in Christology*, a real attempt is made to develop the traditional theology along its own lines, and to solve some of its difficulties. This also is entirely compatible with loyal adherence to the historic Creed.

It was, I believe, Bishop Hall who wrote: "The most useful of all books of theology would be one with the title *De paucitate credendorum*—of the fewness of the things that a man should believe." Judged by this test the historic Creed in any of its traditional forms would appear to some moderns as embodying something much more than a minimum. They would be inclined to say, "Let us go back to the beginnings, and content ourselves with a simple formula such as Cyprian's *Credo in Deum patrem, in filium Christum, in Spiritum sanctum.*"

Something very similar to this has been suggested at the Cambridge Conference by Dr. Cyril Norwood.*

I should be inclined to say that some such simple statement might suffice as *a beginning* for a missionary Church, which has to win for itself a Christian consciousness and a Christian experience. But from the point of view of a reunited Church,

* "I believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in His Holy Spirit."

with its rich inheritance from the past, such a symbol as the "Nicene" may be regarded rightly as a *minimum*. On any other basis a reunited Church, in the largest sense, seems to me to be inconceivable. For ultimately the reunion must aim at embracing the East as well as the West. And signs are not wanting that the East is beginning to look more and more to the West, and especially to this country, as having made the most hopeful experiments in reconciling the old Catholic tradition with modern thought and freedom.

In conclusion, attention may be drawn to the lessons that can be learned on this subject from the experience of the Jewish community.

Judaism, as its apologists are never tired of asserting, has never laid much stress on the acceptance of dogmatic statements of belief as a condition of membership of the religious fellowship. A certain body of belief was always implicit, especially belief in the unity of God as against polytheism. But gradually the need for a formal confession of faith was felt. This was the case when Judaism began to make proselytes. "Only," says the distinguished Jewish scholar Dr. Kohler, "only when contact with the non-Jewish world emphasized the need for a clear expression of belief in the unity of God, such as was found in the *Shema*, and when the proselyte was expected to declare in some definite form the fundamentals of the faith he espoused, was the importance of a concrete *confession* felt. Accordingly we find the beginnings of a formulated belief in the Synagogal liturgy."* Rudimentary creeds can also be found in Philo and Josephus. The process of defining a creed proceeded in the later centuries and culminated in Maimonides, who formulated thirteen articles of faith, which form an integral part, both in their original form and also in a metrical form as a hymn which every Jew knows by heart, in the Synagogue services. There have been protests within Judaism against this method of formulating belief. It has been impugned as speculative and intellectual, and as obscuring the true nature of Judaism in its purely religious aspect as "the great dynamic force for man's moral and spiritual elevation." Nevertheless, Judaism found it necessary to formulate and testify to its fundamental beliefs in order to preserve its coherence. I think we may learn from the experience of the Synagogue a valuable lesson as to the importance and place of a definitely formulated Creed in preserving continuity, while not endangering freedom and development, in the ordered life of the religious fellowship.

G. H. Box.

* *Jewish Theology*, p. 19.

MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION (II.)

ALL prayer and meditation should follow the order of the Lord's Prayer, which is the order of *Life*, and begin and end with the " eye " and the pictorial; the " gazing "; the " loving look " of contemplation, just as contemplation itself, the highest form of prayer, ends in a " look." For love, at its deepest, can only stammer, adore, and be silent.

In itself, then, there is nothing surprising in the wave of the " supernatural " now sweeping over our Religious Houses, or in the emphasis theologians are laying on " supernature," or the present turning of the Anglican Church to ascetical theology (though the Tractarians did that long ago). This phenomenon is no mere product of the war or reaction from the materialism and mechanism of the nineteenth century. It inheres in Life and *thought* itself—in " sound learning," which is said to be our special characteristic. As the body grows by alternations between action and repose, so do religion, civilization, character, life, even thought itself, grow by alternations between activity and quiescence; between reasoning and silent reflectiveness and " beholding."

This is why, if suppressed, the contemplative life will return, if only in the form of pseudo-mysticisms—why the present " Hochkirche " Movement within the Lutheran Church itself is seeking to restore monasticism; and why Russia at the great *Sobor* at Moscow in 1917 and the reigning Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, whom some Greeks call a modernist, have both refused to do away entirely with their contemplative monasticism. For other Communions of the Church think in terms of the *Whole* and of Life. We, priding ourselves on Thought, think in terms of abstractions and call it Life. But necessary as " social service " is to-day, contemplative monasteries are the " reservoirs of prayer," feeding and correcting the activities of the Church. And least of all, in these " psychic " days, when the old arguments brought against monasticism have been riddled by the application to morals, Thought, and even Civics of the phenomena of telepathy, the " group mind," " group silence," " group energy," and the rest, can we deny the activities of prayer and the " unconscious."

The Bishop of Manchester himself has made this clear in his book *Mens Creatrix*, as well as in certain articles in *The Pilgrim*, where he speaks of the need there is in the English Church for balancing her over-activity by the witness of the Orthodox Church to the primacy of *Being*. Undoubtedly, it is difficult for a pragmatic and unphilosophical people like our

own to understand anything that savours of the contemplative, the metaphysical, and ontological. We are impatient of everything but the "Obvious." But this difficulty has been increased by Protestantism, the bad teaching of Church History, and our prejudices and ignorance. Thus the ordinary Englishman is apt to think that contemplation must mean *St. Teresa* and be necessarily associated with swoons, raptures, transports, ecstasies, "transfixions of the heart," stigmata, and psychophysical phenomena generally. But these phenomena are no inherent part of contemplation. "Visions" and the like are the gift of God to certain souls under certain conditions. It is a happy circumstance, in the revision of the contemplative element now going on in the Latin and Orthodox Church, that Lamballe and others have shown, as against Poulain, that contemplation in itself is open to all souls. Even St. Alphonsus Liguori teaches an *acquired* contemplation; and, in point of fact, the contemplative life is not a monopoly of the cloister. Rather are some of the best contemplatives to be found in the homes of the poor, or, for that matter, on the Stock Exchange or in a London Club.

Again, it is quite a mistake to think that contemplatives cannot do *active* work, or ever leave their cloister. No doubt some nuns are specially enclosed in the Latin Church. But at the discretion of their Superiors, contemplatives can undertake pastoral, missionary, educational, literary, and other work. The Carmelites are, strictly, mendicant friars. The Benedictines were the great missionaries of Europe, and now do missionary work in the Colonies. Carthusians have been great preachers, and undertake works of charity. The Trappists are now Reformed Cistercians, and do a great deal of agricultural work, as do also the Cistercians. The Trappistines (nuns) are to be found in the mission-field—*e.g.*, Japan—where they manage orphanages, etc. What is true of the West is true also of the East. Orthodox monasticism is essentially contemplative. More than once Russia rejected proposals for the introduction of the friar system. But these Orthodox contemplatives missionized Russia, Siberia, Alaska, Mohammedan and Tartar territory, etc., while the mission of the monk Bishop Nicholas in Japan, which at one time numbered over 25,000 converts, is one of the most famous in the whole history of the Church. In pre-war Russia contemplative nuns also carried on some of the best equipped and most successful Girls' Schools in Europe.

It remains (*a*) to bring meditation and the various parts of contemplative prayer into relation with the historical experience of the Church East and West; and (*b*) to suggest some methods

in prayer which may quicken meditation and contemplative prayer.

(*a*) It has been said that contemplation differs in the Orthodox and Western Church. Indeed, there are Orthodox who would hardly understand some of our forms of prayer—*e.g.*, intercessory prayer. But this does not necessarily mean that nationality determines the "unconscious," and it is with the "unconscious" chiefly that this article has been hitherto concerned. The truth would seem to be that man does not change fundamentally—"He hath made of one blood all nations of men"; and too much can be made of racial psychology and independent psychologies. Even the Dean of St. Paul's, following Goethe, says that Progress is an accumulation of experience rather than a change of fundamentals.

In point of fact, from earliest times there has been current the same limited number of solutions for the religious, the mystic and the cosmic problem. Dr. Adamson's theory that India has an independent psychology is only partially true. The divisions of Buddhist prayer are almost identical with those of St. Bernard, St. John of the Cross, St. Peter of Alcantara, St. Teresa, St. Alphonsus Liguori, etc. Thus, *vitarka* is contemplation; *vicâra*, reflection, recollection; *vitakha-vicâra*, concentration and meditation; *pîti-sukham*, prayer of quiet, prayer of silence, wordless prayer; *ânanda*, prayer of simplicity, or the first stage of the prayer of union; *samprajñâta samâdhi*, conscious union or unitive prayer; *asamprajñata samâdhi*, or *upekkhâ-sati-parisuddhi*, unconscious union, spiritual marriage, etc. So are the prayer states of Proclus and Algazâli substantially the Teresian. If Plato, Plotinus, and Pseudo-Dionysius influenced Christian mysticism and forms of prayer—though their influence has been exaggerated—it is still *sub judice* whether Indian philosophy and psychology did not reach Greece. The purgative, the illuminative, and the unitive ways are found among the first Christian monks and in Maximos Confessor, the great Byzantine ascetical writer, who tried almost in vain to purge Christian ascetical and mystical theology from Neo-Platonism. If the Greek and, in part, the Balkan Church have departed from Maximos Confessor, it is largely through the influence of Neo-Platonic teaching. If Russia has in some respects done likewise, it is because of Lutheran and political irruptions on the whole. But the fundamentals of the prayer life remain the same. Even Calvin, the Lutheran Arndt, the Reformation "Precisians" and Pietists and others allow for divisions of prayer. Anthropology and the history of religions confirm prayer-systematization.

It will be seen, then, that the prayer life of the Church, and

of the Early Church, East and West, is practically identical, though a genetico-historical account of Christian prayer is one of the books that remain to be written. In his recent *Benedictine Monachism* the former Abbot of Downside Abbey, Dr. Cuthbert Butler, tries to show that the prayer of the Early Church, especially among monks and Benedictine monks, was mainly contemplative, affective, and adorational, rather than definitely petitionary, reasoned out, and formal meditation. This would be in accordance with what has been said about psychology and biology, and Dom Butler is probably right. But there is something to be said for Dom Chapman's contention that Butler minimizes the place of the *intellect* in this early prayer. The " will " hardly comes in, in our present sense of the term, for the " lines " of this prayer were Platonist-Augustinian, though St. Benedict took over this type of prayer from Cassian. The conative will is largely due to Kant, the chief philosopher of Protestantism and the " self-contained " individual. Such meditation (*meditatio*, *melete*) as there was in the Early Church was mainly Bible-reading with a view to contemplative prayer. St. Benedict, for example, uses *meditari* in the military sense of " preparing for," as in Vegetius, *Epitome rei militaris* and Novatian, *De Trinitate*.

On the other hand, Père Watrigant, the great authority on Ignatian Retreats for the people, contends that meditation, in the usual sense of the term, went side by side with contemplative prayer in the Early Church, or, at least, is to be found in early times. It is open to question if he has proved his point. At the same time, it is only fair to remember that he has not yet completed his investigations. The *Moralia* of Gregory the Great, and other early writings, suggest our type of meditation. So do early mediæval writings—*e.g.*, the *De adhærendo Deo*, generally, but wrongly, ascribed to Albert the Great. Early Anglo-Saxonism did not take over the Norman prayer-intellection. To the " fear of the Lord " the mediæval Englishman joined a vivid Nature symbolism and love of Nature. Then the mystical teachings of St. Bonaventura and of Richard of St. Victor came to England as rain to a parched land. Mother Julian runs even to Neo-Platonism here and there. At the same time, there are signs of formal meditation in Hugh of St. Victor and Bonaventura himself. But, strictly speaking, our type of formal meditation seems to have been introduced by the Brethren of the Common Life in Holland and the Windesheim school of spirituality, to which Thomas à Kempis belonged. The following were its chief promoters: Radewin, Gerard of Zutphen, and Mauburnus, Canon of Windesheim, in his *Meditatorium*. L. Barbo, Abbot of the Benedictine monastery of

St. Justina at Padua, made Mauburnus's *Meditatorium* more widely known. From Italy formal meditation passed to Spain; Mauburnus, Gerard, Gerson, and others are all used by Garcia de Cisneros, Abbot of Montserrat, in his *Ejercitario*. This book was read by St. Ignatius Loyola—it has not been proved that he borrowed much, if anything, from it, and the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius followed. These *Exercises* may be said to mark the apogee of formal meditation—at any rate, as to schematism; and *formal* meditation seems to be the outcome of the counter-Reformation and the humanistic and the rationalistic movement in Europe.

The Ignatian *Exercises* do not seem to have had much vogue in the English Church till the twentieth century. J. Hall's *The Art of Divine Meditation* (1607), his *Christ Mysticall* (1647), a favourite work with General Gordon, and his other meditational works keep to the type of meditation in the Early Church. This is also the usual type in the Orthodox Church today. For those who think " verbally "—the Director should know the temperament of his penitents and decide accordingly—the Ignatian *Exercises* are better than our normal books on meditation—*e.g.*, Dr. Mortimer's *Meditations*. Roothaan's edition of the *Spiritual Exercises* is still, on the whole, the best. Father Rickaby's edition and his *Waters that go softly* give useful points. Those who wish to go further should turn to the *Monumenta Ignatiana* (Madrid). Some souls will find help—chiefly from the psychological side—in reading Baudouin's *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion* before or with the Ignatian *Exercises*. For Ignatian Retreats Boissel's *Retraites fermées* (Paris, Beauchesne), Father Plater's books, the *Collection de la Bibliothèque des Exercises de Saint Ignace* (Paris, Lethielleux), and the *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique* are the best.

In accordance with the Pattern Prayer, the Lord's Prayer, all meditation should begin and end with adoration and contemplation (the self-sufficiency, the attributes of God; the Trinity; the thought of God *in Himself* apart from us; the Gifts of the Spirit; praise, thanksgiving, hope, the mastership and ownership of God, etc.). The petitionary element should be subordinate to this, so should contrition, the sense of sin, etc. The conative will should not be exercised at first, and only gradually throughout the meditation, and always with the receptive will. The resolutions (strictly, there should be only one resolution, or the same resolution, at each meditation) should flow from receptivity, " listening," and concepts, rather than from conation and individualized intellection. The point is—work from the over-individual and ideal to the particular, and assimilate rather than reason out. If a point in the medita-

tion is difficult—*i.e.*, if you "stick"—as a rule, leave it and pass on—you have not as yet the right dispositions, and if you try too hard by intellection, you will probably put the soul out of gear. Or stop your meditation, and read a passage in your favourite spiritual book, which should be by your side—it is St. Teresa's advice—or, if possible, rise and say a *Gloria*, or stand silently for a few moments before a crucifix. I am speaking of formal meditation with a book. But much of what has been said applies also to discursive meditation without a book. In either case, avoid anything like intellectual curiosity about God and your soul. Meditation is not self-analysis nor critical Bible-study. If some spiritual point appeals to you, dwell upon it—if necessary, to the exclusion of the rest of the meditation—and, above all, make acts of adoration, hope, and union with our Lord and the Saints. Always keep the corporate nature of Christianity before you. You have no *individual* claim upon God. It is well to have a set time and a fixed length of time for meditation. But the pivot of meditation is less *concentration*, as has been generally taught, than "attention," as psychology is now explaining "attention." The error of traditional psychology was to confuse logical complexity with psychical development. Concentration is too mental and conscious. "Attention" allows for the margins of self; and it is this marginal or "reflex" attention—*i.e.*, the attention when drawn without our foreknowledge by an unexpected stimulation—which often yields the best results, while concentration in itself blunts or hinders the reflex by over-mentality. "Attention" also works best intermittently, for it is easily fatigued. Do not, therefore, be afraid to turn to spiritual reading or some other devotional exercise, breaking off your meditation for this purpose and then resuming it. Five minutes with God is better than a consecutive half-hour with ourselves. Keep to your fixed time if you can, but, *ceteris paribus*, do not worry if your meditation is largely a blank. Duty is always better, and often more fruitful, than fervour. Moreover, your conscious self may experience a blank when your unconscious self is being really nourished. We must not expect God to be obvious. The fruit of five minutes' good meditation may not appear till we are in the next world. One of our greatest failings in prayer is to "set time-limits" to God. Besides, we can fill up the blank of our meditation by mental prayer during the day. And mental prayer, or living in the presence of God, should be the aim and end of all prayer and meditation, and can be made at all times and in all places. Two of the best books on mental prayer are Lehodey's, and Maumigny, *L'oraison mentale* (Paris, Beauchesne). Hock's *The Presence of God* (Würzburg) gives a good

scheme of mental prayer for beginners, but should not be followed too closely. Modern English books should be avoided. The English mind is at present in a transitional state.

It need not be pointed out that meditation can be made kneeling, standing, walking, sitting, but kneeling should, at least, be part of it.

Distractions in prayer and meditation are always a difficulty. They are of various kinds: temperamental; physical (*e.g.*, defective nutrition); pathological; mental, due to what is called "fluid attention," or the impossibility of concentration. Sometimes they are incurable, sometimes curable only by psychoanalysis, for they have their seat in the past life, and here the memory must be inhibited as much as possible, and purged by frequent oblations of it to God; by avoiding many "general confessions," by frequent meditations on the Risen Life, the Sacramental Life, the attributes of God, etc. But, generally, too much is made of distractions in English Devotion. "Fluid attention," for example, is no defect. Some of the Saints had it. If inability to concentrate is constitutional, it is to be received as God's ordinance. And there is all the more reason why the priest should not compel every soul to meditate and pray in a set and fixed manner. In fact, *ceteris paribus*, priests—above all, when it is done from prejudice or ignorance of their craft—undertake an awful responsibility when they refuse to allow a soul to change its prayer and find its own way to its Lord.

But, usually, distractions are of three kinds: Cerebration, thoughtless or wilful distractions, and persistent distractions. Cerebration occurs chiefly when we are tired or indisposed or over-worked, and our mind keeps harking back to our work or the routine of the day. The body being an intimate part of our personality, cerebrations in themselves are not sin and distraction. They should be offered to God and then ignored. As St. Teresa says, the will can remain fixed on God behind them. The question in such distractions is this: "Is my intention Godward?" Persistent distractions, when the conscience is clear, may be taken as a sign that our prayer needs changing, and advice should be sought. Or they should be made a matter for prayer itself. Thoughtless and wilful distractions are nearly always a sign that we are living on our senses and self-love, and are mismanaging our daily life. They indicate that we have shifted our centre of gravity to pride in some form—to our social life, friends, pleasures, books, novels—and that we have wrested desire and imagination from God and built up an imaginary self and world of our own. From the practical side, the main thing to watch here is the tongue—our *talking;* I do not say our conversation, for we English are

not conversationalists. Then the *desire* should be *disillusioned* by accepting humiliations; by pondering on the reversal of human judgments at the Last Day; by Retreats; the *Bona mors;* and the like. If we are strongly sensed, external mortifications are to be frequently used. If our health is weak, our Communions should be expiatory—*i.e.*, made, not so much for ourselves as for the sins of others.

Attention varies with individuals. This should be made a matter of study by the priest; and every book on prayer, meditation, and contemplation should have a psychological introduction. The following little book, with a good bibliography, *Psychology in Education* (Pitman, 1922, 2s. 6d.), will be found useful. No doubt, *too much can be made of psychology in religion*, but with most of us our minds and souls mature too rapidly. We have taken our bias and fallen into routine before we have assimilated a hundredth part of the information which we need, or learned the use of a quarter of those delicate tools which are the furniture of our spiritual and intellectual workshop.

These considerations apply not only to meditation, but in substance to affective and contemplative prayer also. This is the main historical prayer experience of the Church, East and West. It should be used by all, even during parts of formal meditation, but, owing to the present vogue of psychisms, by most souls only at the discretion of their directors. With this proviso, great freedom and individuality should characterize affective and contemplative prayer in its lower stages—the higher are a gift from God intrinsically. Some souls should use the Sulpician and no other method; others, the Ignatian method, and approach contemplative prayer through the *Spiritual Exercises*. Others, again, should be left to themselves with very little counsel from the priest, and direction should take the form of the fundamental Christian principles. This, on the whole, was the method of l'Abbé Huvelin and Father Augustine Baker. The priest should be able to decide which method, if any, is to be followed.

The history of prayer in the Middle Ages has not yet been fully written. Dom C. Butler's book on *Western Mysticism*, just issued, will be of much help here, and books on affective and contemplative prayer will presently be mentioned. But, as D'Alençon and Tillmann show, private prayer in the Middle Ages flowed mainly from liturgical prayer and the Mass. Worship, liturgical life and sense—all these are still weak in the English Church. It may also be that the Cluniac ideal of a multiplicity of devotions has not been altogether conducive to the " best " type of spirituality. Certainly, the multitude of " little books "

—no doubt necessary in many cases—are a snare on the whole, if only because the English mind is not given to "long views," and, as the French say, is apt to think of everything in terms of something else. It is open to question if our modern books have really added anything except modern terminology to the Church's doctrine of prayer, East and West. A "reading," an "experimental" Church—and such, we say, the Anglican Church must be—is all very well if we know how to "read." But our normal English education is not the best guide here, and it is to be feared that desultory devotional reading is one of the evils that threaten Anglican spirituality. The older books are always preferable, and it is best (*a*) to keep to one or two well-tried spiritual books; (*b*) to let affective and contemplative prayer centre in the drama of the Mass; and (*c*) to recite, if possible, the canonical hours of the Church, and draw material for contemplation from the Psalms, etc.

In the Orthodox Church the contemplative element was considerably neo-platonized by Hesychasm, which, however, is not as quietistic as is often thought. It was also subjectivised to some extent by Symeon Theologos, whose relation to Pseudo-Dionysius has not yet been fully examined, and by Kabasilas. The Pseudo-Areopagite's influence is still strong, but Hesychasm, as such, has ceased in Greece and the Balkans. Before the war, Russian theologians were re-examining the ascetical and mystical theology of Orthodoxy. Speaking generally, and allowing for the Slav mentality, affective and contemplative prayer, as we find it in Apa Herman, Seraphim of Saroff, John of Kronstadt and the better monasteries, does not seem to differ substantially from the Western type.

In the West the affective and contemplative elements varied, necessarily, under the theology and psychology of the Scholastics, and the different Religious Orders—Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc. But throughout a certain strain runs from Augustine, Benedict, Gregory the Great, Bernard, Blosius, Walter Hilton, to St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa—even to Ruysbroeck (in some particulars of the lower stages of contemplation). The chief characteristic of this strain is that the mind is stripped of all phantasms and images, and is simplified and tranquillized in God. Within this tranquillization there are, strictly, only four forms of prayer that concern most souls —aspirative prayer; the prayer of simplicity; the prayer of silence; and the prayer of quiet. Of these, the prayer of quiet is the highest and next to contemplation proper. But all of these forms have much in common, and there is no reason why even the busiest person should not use them. In fact, since they are all forms of mental prayer, they can be practised at

any time and in any place—while we are at work, travelling, playing golf. God is not a Puritan.

The following scheme may be suggested for a soul desiring to reach the prayer of quiet. First, ejaculatory and aspirative prayer should be used to quicken attention, such as the "Holy Name" frequently repeated, and "My God, when shall I love Thee alone?" Next should follow a careful examination of conscience. Then acts of contrition, special attention being paid to sins of omission, negligences, etc.—from a motive, if possible, of the goodness, love, and mercy of God. The next step is entire resignation to God's will solely (this is important) for *God's glory*. All personal interests and sensible devotion should be renounced. Then will follow a brief meditation on the mysteries of the Incarnation and Passion, and association with the suffering humanity of our Lord, together with ejaculatory prayer. Here the conative will may come in and forced acts (love, adoration, hope, expectancy, etc.) be employed. At other stages of this form of prayer only the prayer of simplicity should be used. The prayer of simplicity is practically the same as affective prayer, or mental prayer in which reasoning is largely replaced by intuition, and affections and resolutions are only slightly varied and expressed in few words. Forced acts should not necessarily be used in the prayer of simplicity. Finally, a firm act of faith should be made, acknowledging God's presence in the centre of the soul, and the soul be frequently offered to God with profound love, awe, and humility. It is important not to hurry over the fourth and fifth steps in this process. Here patience, which Tertullian penetratingly calls the "foster-daughter of God," is pivotal. The soul should wait till she feels disposed to quit all express acts or affections, but retaining an implicit assurance by bare faith that God, the incomprehensible universal Goodness, is really present in and to her. The prayer of (interior) silence is an inchoate and incomplete stage of the prayer of quiet. In studying Baker's account of the Prayer of Interior Silence in his *Sancta Sophia*, care should be taken to read first an article on *Sancta Sophia* in the *Dublin Review* of October, 1876.

Further to pursue this subject here is impossible. Enough has been said to show that affective prayer and the lower degrees of contemplation are no monopoly of the cloister or "favoured souls." Indeed, as regards the higher stages of the contemplative element—"extraordinary" and "mystic" contemplation—we may not affirm that no higher stages of consciousness, such as the mystic claims to have reached, are possible for the human mind. At the same time, despite the present dominance of the immanential principle in religion, we cannot rule out

the " transcendent " and God's freedom of action upon a soul —least of all in these days of thought transference. Even if we hold that all knowledge comes from our senses, we cannot say that the mind may not be directly influenced by God, and God, as spiritual, be in the mind as an idea is in the mind, since there is nothing material in God, and, therefore, nothing to stand in any sense outside the mind. Co-consciousness, which is not the same thing as absorptionism, need not necessarily be pathological.

Nor is this the place to enter into the discussion between spiritual writers as to which of the various states of prayer are mystical and extraordinary, and which are not. It must suffice to say that Father Poulain's *The Graces of Interior Prayer*—a book widely used—needs controlling by the *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*, *La Vie Spirituelle*, Arintero's *Evolucion Mistica* (Salamanca), and other books and periodicals. Here, too, Bremond's *Histoire du Sentiment Religieux en France* (Paris, Bloud et Gay, in progress), of which an English translation has been begun, is of prime importance. Some general remarks may, however, be made.

If Hooker be indeed the supreme theologian of Anglicanism, Hooker's ethics postulate affective and contemplative prayer, in the historical sense already explained, and this type of prayer runs through Andrewes, Herbert, Jeremy Taylor, Law (in his earlier period) and others. The refusal, then, of some priests to allow souls to " change " their prayer may be wise enough in certain cases. But when this refusal is based, as it often is, on ethical grounds, it should be remembered that hedonistic considerations forced Butler himself, of the *Analogy*, to " side-track " some of Hooker's ethical positions, and that not a few of the prevailing ideas in the English Church on prayer hinge on survivals of Puritanism; the Hanoverian dread of the supernatural; and the philosophy and psychology of Hume and Locke as well as of the eighteenth-century English school of moralists.

No doubt, some of the degrees of prayer need re-examining in the light of psychology. Roman Catholic writers themselves admit that St. Teresa and St. Ignatius Loyola sometimes mistake motions of the subconscious for states of prayer. It is also to be remembered that, in a sense, Roman Catholicism as it is to day is largely the result of the play of those forces which elsewhere produced Lutheranism, Calvinism and the rest, and it may be questioned whether, on the whole, we can meet modern conditions by much in modern Roman Catholicism, as Dom Morin has himself said. We need to get back to the main stream of spirituality before the Reformation—that spirituality

which is so sane, so natural, so true to the best psychology of human nature. Still, when all this has been said, it remains true that, although much in ethics, human psychology, and epistemology has been made clearer during the last thirty years or so, the penetration of the processes operative in the life of prayer, which we owe to a St. Augustine, a St. Bernard, and a St. Teresa, are still unsurpassed; indeed, on central points they are unapproached to this very hour.

Even from the strictly ethical standpoint it will be wise, then, to keep to the older books; and though too much has been made of the influence of nationality on devotion, English devotion will be well advised in not departing from Augustine Baker's *Sancta Sophia* as a standard book on prayer, together with the devotional writings of the great Maurists. Some will prefer the older edition of *Sancta Sophia;* others will find Dom Weld-Blundell's revision and abridgment of *Sancta Sophia* under the title, *Contemplative Prayer* (Burns and Oates) more useful, because modernized. To this abridgment may be added the works of Saudreau, more especially his *Degrees of the Spiritual Life* and his *Vie d'Union à Dieu ;* the works of Louismet (with caution); Lamballe's *Mystical Contemplation* (with caution); Venant, *De la Meditation à la Contemplation* (Bruges, Beyaert); the *Collationes Brugenses*, edited by Mgr. Waffelaert, Bishop of Bruges—a work that should be in the libraries of retreat-houses; the *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique;* Grou's and Hedley's *Works;* Poulain's *Prayer of Simplicity;* Rutherford's *Mental Prayer*, etc.

As an aid to better meditation and to affective and contemplative prayer, the following suggestions may perhaps be offered:

(1) In Bible-reading use St. Paul sparingly, and concentrate on the Synoptic Gospels and St. John. St. Paul's relation to the Gospels has not yet been thoroughly worked out. It is enough to say here that a good deal of English religion is still Lutheranized, and Lutheranism is one-sided Paulinism, with the " outlook " of the Gospel record minimized.

(2) Practise sacramental sensibility, or what is broadly called introversion—that is, the presence of Christ within you rather than the presence of God around you. Be a living Eucharist.

(3) Practise the " sharable self "—that Christ shares your self with you. " I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me " is not a mere will-union, but a vital union, as Westcott says. This will guard against the quietistic tendency, so marked a feature of some of the mystical teaching of our day. Moreover, the practice of the " sharable " self helps us to under-

stand those periods of aridity in prayer which we cannot often account for by failure on our part. Aridity of this kind is often nothing more than what the French call "stepping back in order to jump better." Christ is testing the patience of His work in our souls. Aridity—which, let it be remembered, is not the same thing as tepidity—often comes when we need to change our prayer, when we are about to pass from one stage of prayer to another, but the right degree for this progress is not yet in the mind, though it may be already there in the desire and volition—I do not say the *will*—and so Christ keeps us waiting till our mind can coalesce with His mind within us through the sharable self, but as yet dormant.

(4) On the whole, and for most people—more especially with a view to acquiring the *spirit* of prayer—prayer should be short, but frequent. For the end of all prayer is living in the presence of God, or mental prayer. But it is a scientific fact that the faculty of "attention," which is one of the secrets of "good" prayer, gets easily fagged, and that "attention" works best "by fits and starts." No doubt some take longer than others to "get into" their prayer. Still, this rule of intermittent prayer is sound psychologically, and has the warrant of the best spiritual writers.

(5) The Reformation more particularly bequeathed to us the idea of prayer as Duty rather than as *Love*, and as Duty—right enough as far as it goes—prayer is generally recognized in the English Church. But there are times when the spontaneousness of Love will carry us further than the obligatoriness of Duty. Such times are the times that come to all, when we simply cannot pray. At such times (*a*) recognize that dryness and desolation are *normal* parts of prayer, and modify as much as needs be the kind or amount of your prayer—back, say, from the prayer of quiet to ordinary meditation, vocal prayer, even to but a few uttered aspirations. (*b*) Secondly, as Grou advises, have some hobby, or wholesome natural interest, to which you can turn. Grou used to translate Plato or Livy when he could not pray, and this is one reason why his spiritual writings are so fresh and living. And it is freshness in prayer that "counts." Duty can be forced; Love must be spontaneous.

(6) The soul should sink itself in the *delightfulness* of God, and remember that man comes to his true self in loving God. God is the very ocean of Himself—of Love—apart from all creation. Thus the positions between God and man and between man and God are utterly uninterchangeable. "Hence the most fundamental need, duty, honour, and happiness of man is not Petition nor even Contrition, nor, again, Thanksgiving, though these must always have a place in our spiritual

life, but *Adoration*. And it is St. Augustine himself, so intellectual and so anthropomorphic in his devotion, who is above all the Saint of Adoring Prayer."

THE ABBOT OF PERSHORE.

NOTE.—I owe some thoughts in this article to an unpublished paper by Baron von Hügel.

THE GOSPEL OF THE SON OF MAN

A VITAL element in the teaching of Jesus has been strangely neglected in Christian doctrine; we have been so preoccupied with the Gospel as God's effort to reach man, that we have been deaf to the glorious tidings of the Divine acceptance of man's efforts to reach God. We hear much of the Incarnation as an act of mercy to a fallen race; we hear nothing of the Incarnation as an act of honour to the spiritual heroes of the race. We are taught to see in the Old Testament a long succession of tendencies and events that prepared the way for the coming of the Christ; yet we must regard the men who struggled so earnestly for the truth, "of whom the world was not worthy," as complete failures whose work was such utter rubbish that it all had to be swept away. It is laid down as an axiom that no human achievement can be acceptable to God except through the Redemption of Christ; the magnificent heritage of our race, a tale of the invincible determination of noble men in the quest for the light, a story of martyrdom and courage and spiritual endeavour in face of persecution and darkness and agony of soul, all this must be churned up until it can pass through the filter of our doctrinal code. Yet our Lord expressly declared that He had come, not to destroy this spiritual heritage, but to complete it; He accepted their attainment as of such value that all He had to do was to finish what they had begun. The highest conceivable honour was accorded to the "Prophets and righteous men" of the past, when the Deity came to share their endeavour.

It was the great respect in which Jesus held the Prophets that led Him to desire to fulfil their predictions; modern theology is inclined to evade this fact, but the Gospels make it plain that at a most critical moment in our Lord's life, when His followers wished to rescue Him from His captors, He restrained them, saying, "How then can the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" Western thought hardly consents to accept the idea of a deliberate attempt to verify predictions; but this is mainly caused by a strange blindness of attitude to the nature of such predictions; perhaps we can see this principle most clearly in the similar case of the Passover.

At the Last Supper Jesus evidently regarded His approaching Passion as a fulfilment of the Passover; by this He was, to some extent, guided and animated when He went to His doom. Before we say that this reduces His Passion to the level of a Jewish ceremonial, let us first ask whether He regarded the Passover in the nature of a ceremonial.

The origin of the Passover is lost in the mists of antiquity; it was used in celebrating the deliverance of Israel from Egypt; but beneath this there lies a deeper significance in its use as a means of atonement; probably it was an adaptation of primitive rites of sacrifice and propitiation, ceremonial means through which men had sought to find peace and forgiveness. This vital fact tells of an origin in the spiritual needs of man; before any ceremonial came into existence, men had craved for peace with God; the deep longings of many souls gradually found expression in the growth of these rites. Yet it also tells just as clearly of a longing to bring peace to other men, in the family, the tribe, or the nation; here was a way of peace, laid open by the yearning of noble men for the salvation of their fellows. The altar of sacrifice was built on the travail of human souls. All through the centuries the antiquated ceremonial had lived on, in the power of the redemptive longing which had given birth to it. The desire for finding a means of atonement had been so real, so deep, so true, that the expression of it was radically true and just, worthy of acceptance by One Who was inspired by the same redeeming love for men, worthy of His acceptance as a true index of the highest aspirations of the human spirit, worthy of the eternal honour of the Cross.

Take the Passover as an ordinance dictated by Divine inspiration, and you lose its vital humanity and make its fulfilment a baffling puzzle; take it as the crystallization of a noble element in human nature, and it becomes inevitable that the Son of Man will find the living meaning enshrined within it. We are apt to go back from the Land of Promise to the realm of mummies; seeing, we see not. Our Bible tells us plainly of these ancient rites and of the honour accorded to them in that Sacrament which makes us one with the whole spiritual heritage of our race.

Our Lord's references to the Prophets make it plain that He had heard their voices calling to Him from the past; if we think of the spiritual isolation of His life at Nazareth, we see a wealth of meaning in the loving admiration with which He speaks of them, and in His indignation with those who perverted the dead letter of their words. Jesus speaks of a spiritual sympathy and affinity that unite men more intimately than those dear ties of family affection which meant so much

to Him; it is obvious that He spoke from experience, yet we can find no trace of any men of Nazareth who could have helped Him to such an experience; hence we cannot doubt that He had learnt this living sympathy from the spirits of those who spoke to Him from the past; they told of the same hunger for righteousness, the same thirst for the salvation of men, that He felt so deeply in His own soul. We need not wonder at His delight in completing their attainment and fulfilling their hopes; He was bearing witness to the value of the words through which their spirits had sought expression.

For He Himself was the perfect Man; in Him the spirit of man, so long baffled in its incessant attempts to reach the light, at length won its victory. He did not claim that His perfect humanity was His own solitary achievement: He claimed it as the Son of Man, the Heir of all the true representatives of the race. It was of the very essence of His work that it should be human. He accepted a heritage in which He alone had the power to see its potential value; He wrought that heritage to perfection. The Son of God had taken upon Himself the limitations of human nature; He confined His work to the task of the Son of Man. Thus He gives us a pattern of the human virtue of filial duty.

To One Who so deeply venerated the Prophets there must have been a supreme joy in finding that His own life was actually fulfilling their longings for the Coming of the Messiah; we miss the real meaning of Jesus' attitude if we turn to the literal predictions rather than to the indomitable spirit that spoke through them. At one time it seemed as though His disciples would enter into full sympathy with their Master, when they had risen to faith in Him as the Messiah; but His delight was at once checked by their repugnance at the thought of His suffering; in the Transfiguration we see the Son of Man receiving, from the living representatives of the Law and the Prophets, the sympathy and encouragement that He could not find in His own generation.

That Jesus regarded His spiritual ancestors as a great succession, the augmentors of a developing faith, seems probable from His praise of John the Baptist as the greatest of men; he was " more than a prophet," as the last of those that prepared the way of the Christ. The Gospels make it clear that Jesus had a very high admiration for the only great man whom He met in the flesh; He founded His opening work on John's; His first message was quoted from him. The work of John was of inestimable value; the voice of a living Prophet broke the silence of Nazareth and brought to life all the slumbering echoes of history.

For the Israelites had lived in contact with the spiritual developments of the great empires of the past; they had shown a unique talent for absorbing all that was best into their own faith. No empire ever became mighty except in the power of a living ideal; the history of the world is a mere skeleton, apart from the history of the spirit; the Chosen People have given us an epitome of the spiritual history of man. The Son of Man is the personification of that history in perfection.

The Atonement was the completion of a task that men had initiated; all the pleading agony of the centuries, that sought for the forgiveness and restoration of men, all the merciful love that speaks through ceremonial and law and psalm and prophecy, all that gives expression to the true spirit of man—all is wrought to completion by Him Who alone availed to complete it. The Son of Man sheds an inconceivable glory on our race. This is no disparagement to the Divinity of His Atonement: it was, indeed, a Divinely merciful act to accept humanity's efforts for the salvation of humanity, to weave our redemption into the very fabric of our nature.

We await the final consummation of the task that was involved in the Incarnation; just as the Son of Man came, when the way had been prepared by man, to complete what man had begun, so He will again come as the Son of Man, to accept and honour and complete the work that man is now called to do for Him. The task of the "apocalyptic" Son of Man will be the final outcome of His Incarnation. When we remember how repeatedly Jesus emphasized the necessity of bearing this in mind, to be the living inspiration of all our endeavour, we cannot but feel that the Church has strangely neglected this glorious heritage of hope.

Do we seem to omit all mention of the Divine inspiration of man, to picture men as struggling upwards without any help or guidance? That would give a false impression; the inspiration and help of God are open equally to all men: few have found the way. All honour to the noble men whose loyalty to truth and invincible determination made them worthy to be the representatives of the spirit of man in its response to the call of God.

Our thoughts return to that great Sacrament in which we are given our part in a heritage fraught with memories so glorious that they lead our spirits into realms too high for utterance, where spirit calls to spirit across the deep, where the voices of our brethren bid us to be worthy, where in the Love of God we seem to realize the Grace of our Lord through the vast Communion of the Holy Spirit.

H. O. CAVALIER.

MISCELLANEA

STUDIES IN TEXTS

1 Cor. xiii. 13: *νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις, ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη· τὰ τρία ταῦτα, μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη* (Westcott-Hort's punctuation).

"But now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love" (R.V.).

The apostle has been contrasting love with the other virtues, including faith and hope. Comparing faith with love he says: "If I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing." All that is of permanent value in faith and hope is included in love, which "believeth all things, hopeth all things." That he would have included hope among the things that pass away may be inferred from Rom. viii. 24—"hope that is seen is not hope." The familiar verse of a hymn sums up his line of thought:

> Faith will vanish into sight,
> Hope be emptied in delight,
> Love in heaven will shine more bright,
> Therefore give us love.

Why then does St. Paul end by saying that faith, hope, and love all abide? Even though there is no question of exact theological definition here, the change of standpoint is remarkable. Two explanations suggest themselves.

(*a*) "Now abideth" refers to the present dispensation. Faith, hope, love, are of abiding value here, but love is greatest since it lasts on into the next world. So von Harnack (quoted by Reitzenstein, *Historia Monachorum und Historia Lausiaca*, p. 101). The temporal sense of *νυνί* is as well attested in St. Paul as the logical, adversative sense. The meaning would apparently be that spiritual endowments fall into three classes: (i.) knowledge, tongues, etc., which pass away; (ii.) faith and hope, which have an abiding value in this life; (iii.) love, which lasts for ever. Nothing in the chapter so far bears out such a tripartite division.

(*b*) We must never forget that the epistles were dictated. The thoughts underlying 1 Cor. xiii. will have often been in St. Paul's mind, and perhaps used in sermons. But when he expressed them in this classical form he was inspired and far above his usual level. Something of ecstasy, of the gift of prophesying, possessed him, and the words were spoken "at one golden time, in a gush of the spirit, when the man must have been trembling" (John Masefield of a passage in *Antony and Cleopatra*). It is perverse to look for a severely logical argument in such circumstances. On the other hand, a sufficient cause must be found for the sudden change at the end of the chapter. This is given if we may suppose "faith, hope, love" to have been a phrase, familiar to speaker and readers alike, which came unasked to his lips. Instead of ending ". . . even as I am known. But now [*i.e.*, as it is] love alone *μένει* [has abiding value]," he starts with the singular verb, and then, without regard for logical consistency, introduces the familiar triad, saving the situation by adding "but [not "and" as R.V.] the greatest of these is love." Leitzmann and J. Weiss had already hinted at this solution in their commentaries, but it was left for Reitzenstein in 1916 (*op. cit.* p. 100) to produce a parallel. Porphyry

ad Marcellam, c. 24, says: "Let four elementary principles especially be firmly held as regards God: faith, truth, love, hope"—*τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα μάλιστα κεκρατύνθω περὶ θεοῦ· πίστις, ἀλήθεια, ἔρως, ἐλ πίς*. A third-century philosopher may have been influenced by the New Testament, but it is more likely that St. Paul altered the pagan *ἔρως* with its unworthy associations to the Christian *ἀγάπη* than that Porphyry or some predecessor carried out the reverse process. If a third-century Neoplatonist had the phrase, it may have been current among Stoics at Tarsus and elsewhere in the first century. "Truth" may have been added by Porphyry to a familiar formula—it is less obviously an attitude of the soul towards God than the others, and Porphyry perhaps desired to get *four elements*. So the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in February, 1923, during the debate on the Address commended four monosyllables to his hearers—faith, hope, love, work.

Reitzenstein suggests that St. Paul had the four "elements" in his mind and struck out *ἀλήθεια*. "Truth" was founded on "knowledge" and therefore was unattainable in this life. The Corinthians had boasted of "knowledge," the limitations of which St. Paul set himself to expose.

W. K. L. C.

DOCUMENTS

Relating to the Appointment of a Commission on Christian Doctrine

I

Letter to His Grace the Most Reverend the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury

Your Grace,

After discussing the subject at a series of Meetings we desire to suggest to your Grace the appointment of a Commission to endeavour to find a basis of doctrinal agreement on matters which are the subject of controversy between different sections of the Church of England.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the methods of controversy traditional in ecclesiastical matters show no prospect of yielding any fruitful results. They rather tend to perpetuate the existence of hostility and suspicion, and to divert to the sphere of controversy energies which should be devoted to the edification of the faithful and to the conversion of unbelievers both at home and abroad. Moreover, the perpetuation of controversy weakens the loyalty of individuals and their sense of obligation to the Church of which they are members, and it renders the Church as a whole powerless to give her proper witness in the political and social difficulties of the present time. Consequently many men of all parties are growing weary of disputes and are anxious to find a basis of agreement with other elements in the English Church. In view of the great efforts that are being made to secure the reunion with other Christian bodies it seems only reasonable that such efforts should find their necessary complement within the Church of England; indeed, reunion with other bodies without a more real unity among ourselves will at best only increase the existing confusion.

We do not disguise from ourselves the possibility that the attempt

to find a basis of doctrinal agreement might reveal the existence of differences of so irremovable a character as to render impossible anything but a purely artificial and external unity based on the fact of the Establishment rather than on agreement in belief. There are, indeed, critics of the Church of England who say that, in fact, our differences are fundamental. We believe, however, agreement might be reached both on the essentials of the Christian faith, and on the more important of those points of controversy which have bitterly divided us in the past. We believe that an enquiry animated by nothing but the desire to arrive at the truth would ultimately reveal that the matters on which agreement was impossible were those on which differences of opinion are obviously legitimate and even, within certain limits, desirable. Possibly some few, as the result of such an agreement, might secede voluntarily to other bodies, though our whole purpose is not to promote but to preclude secession. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the only adequate safeguard against far more serious disruption lies not in the fact of the Establishment, but in securing a genuine unity of belief. We are convinced that in spite of her failings the Church of England stands for a certain vital aspect of Christianity, and that it should prove possible for the vast majority of her members to agree upon an unambiguous statement of her doctrines to which they could give general adherence. On the other hand, we desire to make clear that we would wish such a statement to be regarded not as a new test but as an expression of the Church's official teaching.

Whether or no the human mind is capable of attaining absolute truth, we should be disloyal to our faith if we denied that if men sincerely and prayerfully seek truth they will approach nearer to it and therefore to each other. Such a failure of faith would create a dangerous atmosphere of distrust at a time when fundamental doctrines are being brought into question.

Again, it is of almost primary importance to solve the actual pastoral problem which is presented by directly contradictory teaching in different parishes in respect of doctrines which are closely bound up with the devotional life of all Christians. Such contradictions often affect disastrously the religious life of individuals. They constitute also a graver obstacle than is ordinarily recognized to the evangelization of the nation.

People differ on particular questions because they differ as to the grounds of belief; it is through re-examination of these grounds that differences will be reconciled and agreement will be reached. Such re-examination appears to us also to be required for this other reason: our apologetic as well as our doctrinal teaching is inconsistent, and is therefore far less effective than it ought to be. We are now face to face with serious tendencies of modern thought and teaching which assail not only Christian doctrine but also Christian morality. Our apologetic therefore needs to be consistent and convincing.

We believe that a sincere attempt to surmount our differences will be fruitful of much good; that it might secure a substantial unity of doctrine in matters of importance, while neither imposing a cut-and-dried system nor creating new tests, nor ignoring the fact that different temperaments need different methods of devotion. We urge therefore that a commission should be appointed for this purpose.

At the same time, we are convinced that certain conditions are,

humanly speaking, essential if any good result is to be attained by such a step; and we have in mind especially three suggestions which appear to us so important that we venture to put them before your Grace. In the first place, the work should be undertaken with a very great sense of responsibility and should be solemnly commended by authority to the prayers of the Church. Secondly, it should be recognized from the first that any such commission can only adequately achieve its purpose by systematic work extending over a long period: in short, that the work should be regarded as no less onerous and no less important than, for example, the production of the R.V. of the New Testament. On the other hand, we think it would be essential that an interim report should be presented in a year or two in order that the committee should not be continued unless a substantial measure of success seemed likely to be secured.

We believe also that the choice of men to serve on the Commission should be determined mainly by four considerations:

(i.) They must be thoroughly representative of all those parties in the Church, however extreme in whatever direction, which are willing to seek a basis of agreement.

(ii.) They must be men of wide sympathies and tolerant temper, who will be able and anxious to understand each other's position.

(iii.) They must be men of constructive minds. Men may have all the qualities mentioned above and yet lack the imaginative power to create a synthesis.

(iv.) In order that continuity of work and thought may be secured, a large proportion of them should be comparatively young men, say under forty-five.

We desire to be always,

Your Grace's obedient and faithful servants,

H. M. Oxon.	M. E. Atlay.	O. Quick.
G. Bristol.	G. H. Clayton.	C. E. Raven.
J. E. Chelmsford.	A. S. Duncan-Jones.	T. G. Rogers.
H. L. Chester.	M. G. Glazebrook.	E. G. Selwyn.
M. L. Hereford.	H. L. Goudge.	C. J. Shebbeare.
J. Lichfield.	A. W. Greenup.	W. Spens.
W. Manchester.	G. F. Irwin.	L. S. Thornton.
T. Petriburg.	W. Knox.	F. Underhill.
M. St. Albans.	J. K. Mozley.	H. A. Wilson.

January, 1922.

II

Letter from His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury

Lambeth Palace, S.E.
February 15, 1922.

My dear Bishop of Oxford,

I have, as you know, been giving careful and prolonged consideration to the printed letter which you sent to me some three weeks ago. The signatures appended to it, including as they do those of nine Diocesan Bishops, must in any case have ensured for it something more than respectful attention. And the subject-matter of the letter is such

as to call imperatively for the counsel of our best thinkers. That counsel, as you already to some extent know, I have taken, and what I now write to you is the outcome of my own subsequent thought and prayer.

I do not see my way to doing exactly what your letter asks. I am profoundly conscious of the truth of your contention as to the confusion, the harmfulness, and the probable needlessness of a great deal of present-day controversy within the Church. The second paragraph of your letter has my full concurrence. I believe accordingly that endeavours may usefully be made to obtain by conferences "a basis of doctrinal agreement on matters which are the subject of controversy between different sections of the Church of England."

My difficulty arises when you go on to advocate the procedure which, in your judgment, might now be usefully adopted. You ask me to appoint a Commission consisting in large proportion of comparatively young men "thoroughly representative of all those parties in the Church, however extreme in whatever direction, which are willing to seek a basis of agreement," in order that, with a view to "securing a genuine unity of belief," they may draw up "an unambiguous statement of the doctrines of the Church of England to which they could give general adherence"; this statement "to be regarded . . . as an expression of the Church's official teaching."

The gravity and the far-reaching character of this proposal are such as to make me wonder whether it does not say more than you actually mean. If it were laid upon me to appoint with such instruction or "reference" a Commission to be "solemnly recommended by authority to the prayers of the Church" for a task which, in your judgment, would certainly occupy several years, I honestly confess that I do not know to what body of picked men, a large proportion of them under forty-five years of age, I could properly assign it, or what character or authority would belong to such "expression of the Church's official teaching" when ultimately produced.

I should like to have a clearer indication of the sort of questions—theological, ecclesiastical, or practical—to which you think such a Commission might find useful answer, and in what sort of shape you suggest that such answer should be formulated. I should also like to have some indication as to the number of men, roughly speaking, whom you have in mind for the constitution of such a Commission, and as to its relation, if any, to the existing Synodical and Constitutional bodies of the Church of England.

It may possibly be my own fault, but I feel that I should be very much better able to answer or deal with the request if you could thus elucidate your letter.

Does it seem that I am replying to you unsympathetically or coldly? I think you know me well enough to be assured that nothing is further from my thought. With my whole heart do I desire and pray for a closer fellowship in thought and prayer and action among the different sections of our Church. I deem it a privilege as well as a duty to promote such fellowship, and I share, deliberately and confidently, your belief that conference, even among those who seem most widely sundered, may produce surprising results in revealing a larger unity and a closer sympathy in sacred things than either the controversialists or their critics had dreamed of. What were known as the Fulham Conferences of 1900 and 1901, inaugurated by Bishop Creighton, as well as many

similar and subsequent gatherings, give ground for this firm hope. Therefore I do most warmly encourage you to persevere in your endeavour, perhaps restating the proposal, if you see your way thereto, in rather different terms. You will find me more than ready to welcome for consideration what you may put before me.

I have already called attention to your phrase that the Commission you desire to see appointed should be thoroughly representative of "all those parties in the Church, however extreme in whatever direction, which are willing to seek a basis of agreement." That, as things now are, that endeavour has its element of peril you will be the first to realize. The names of those who have signed your letter give a guarantee of earnestness, capacity, and devotion of every kind; and it is with an earnest prayer that the plan which you have propounded for consideration may, under Him whose leadership has been promised to guide us into all the truth, be so developed as to prove eminently helpful in a time of many perplexities, of frequent anxieties, but above all of abounding opportunity and good-will,

I am,
Yours very truly,
RANDALL CANTUAR.

III

Second Letter to His Grace the Most Rev. the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury

YOUR GRACE,

We desire, first of all, to express our most grateful appreciation of the consideration you have shown to the Memorial addressed to you in December last and of the counsel your Grace has given to us in your reply.

In reply to your Grace we would wish to make clear that we do not contemplate, and have never contemplated, authority being given to a commission to frame either a statement of doctrine which would be binding on the Church or the clergy, or even a statement of doctrine which would *ipso facto* be held to be the official teaching of the Church. In regard to the first of these possibilities we have emphatically no desire to see new tests imposed. We believe that doctrinal agreement has a legitimate claim to be regarded as authoritative precisely in the degree in which it is a free agreement. In regard to the second possibility any such procedure would be obviously inconsistent with due regard for the function of the Episcopate. It is for the Bishops to consider how far further action might be desirable in regard to any agreed conclusions which such a Commission might reach.

What we are immediately concerned to secure is not this or that expression of closer agreement between different points of view when once this has been reached, but a step which will emphasize the importance of closer agreement and which will initiate a more systematic effort to find bases for such agreement. We have repudiated any desire to see the enforcement by authority of a series of doctrinal conclusions. But we would wish to quote and to make our own a sentence which occurs in the course of a vigorous protest against such a use of authority. In his published reply to Cardinal Mercier Father Tyrrell wrote as follows:

> "I am not blind to the fact that variety without unity may be almost as great an evil as unity without variety; that where

> general agreement is not the goal of all individual effort, and where diversity is accepted as final and satisfactory, there can be no progress, but only an aimless analysis and disintegration."

With many of Father Tyrrell's conclusions and arguments we should disagree; but apart from the question of which of the two evils he mentions is the greater, we find it impossible to frame a better statement of our attitude to doctrinal unity. Both an enforced uniformity and acquiescence, indefinitely continued, in grave doctrinal differences, which closely affect the religious life of every member of the Church, seem to us to be serious dangers to the well-being of the Church.

We are convinced that the problem is not merely to discover an agreement which already exists. On a number of important questions there is disagreement which is as real as it is disastrous. We would submit to your Grace with all the emphasis within our power that our present disagreements can only be overcome in any degree by a laborious and systematic effort to reconcile different points of view in a clearer apprehension of those truths of which the different points of view give a partial presentation. We are jealous for liberty of thought, but we are no less desirous that every effort should be made to reconcile disagreements by a closer approach to truth, that this goal should be steadily set before the Church by those in authority, and that those in authority should themselves initiate a more systematic effort in this direction. Valuable and necessary as are informal conferences, in our judgment there is also required a more systematic, laborious, and continued effort than can thus be secured. We are anxious to see the Bishops themselves initiate such an effort because their action would bring before the Church the importance of finding and appreciating the real agreement that lies behind divergencies, and of diminishing as far as possible these divergencies, and would thus do much to create the right atmosphere for the enquiry; but we also desire official action, because such an effort would be so onerous as well as so important that men could only fairly be asked to co-operate in it in response to an authoritative appeal.

We thank God that the Church of England affords opportunities for wide varieties of experience and reflection. We cannot but feel that our Church at present fails to carry out as adequately as is possible the further function of seeking and securing a synthesis: for thus only can those varieties become fruitful for the corporate life of the Church.

We venture therefore respectfully to suggest in answer to the specific questions your Grace has put to us—

(1) That a small Committee should be appointed by your Grace in consultation with his Grace the Archbishop of York to submit to your Graces the names of those whom they believe after enquiry to be really representative of different points of view within the Church of England, with a view to serving on the suggested Commission.

(2) That the Commission should consist of about twenty persons.

(3) That the reference of the Commission should be to consider the nature and grounds of Christian doctrine with a view to demonstrating the extent of existing agreement and with a view to investigating how far it is possible to remove or diminish existing differences.

(4) That the Report of the Commission should not be an authorita-

tive statement, but would, we hope, be laid before the Bishops for them to consider what further action (if any) should be taken.

We desire to be always

Your Grace's faithful and obedient servants,

H. M. Oxon.	M. E. Atlay.	O. Quick.
G. Bristol.	G. H. Clayton.	C. E. Raven.
J. E. Chelmsford.	A. S. Duncan-Jones.	T. G. Rogers.
H. L. Chester.	M. G. Glazebrook.	E. G. Selwyn.
M. L. Hereford.	H. L. Goudge.	C. J. Shebbeare.
J. Lichfield.	A. W. Greenup.	W. Spens.
W. Manchester.	G. F. Irwin.	L. S. Thornton.
T. Petriburg.	W. Knox.	F. Underhill.
M. St. Albans.	J. K. Mozley.	H. A. Wilson.

May 4, 1922.

IV

Second Letter from His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury

Lambeth Palace, S.E.
September 8, 1922.

My dear Bishop of Oxford,

I have now taken counsel with the Archbishop of York about the action we are asked to take in regard to the weighty Memorial which, in its amended form, you transmitted to me some little time ago. It seems clear to us both that if so important a body of men as those whose names are appended to your printed letter are deliberately of opinion that the Commission they ask for might be effective in the direction of removing or diminishing differences, the existence of which is unnecessary, it is our clear duty to facilitate in any way that we can the inquiry which you think such a Commission could usefully undertake.

We feel, however, that it will on the whole be best that you should transmit to me in the name of all those who have signed the Memorial a suggestion as to the names of the men who might appropriately be appointed to serve on the Commission. We should be ready to take the responsibility of considering independently the list of names which you might submit to us, and of suggesting alternatives or additions if those seemed to us desirable. And we both of us desire to express strong hope that the signatories of your Memorial will not scruple to suggest for the ultimate Commission some of their own number, as it is obvious that their presence and aid are indispensable.

I am,

Yours very truly,

Randall Cantuar.

V

Letter from the Bishop of Oxford to the Members of the Commission

Cuddesdon,
Wheatley, Oxon.
January 1, 1923.

I have received the following letter from the Archbishop with the list of those whom he wishes to nominate on the Commission. I earnestly trust you may find it possible to allow me to inform His Grace that you are willing to serve.

Hubert M. Oxon.

VI

LAMBETH PALACE, S.E.
December 28, 1922.

MY DEAR BISHOP OF OXFORD,

In pursuance of my letter of September 8 and of your subsequent letter of November 29 I write on behalf of the Archbishop of York and myself to say that it is our wish to nominate those whose names I append hereto to act as a Commission with the following Reference—

> To consider the nature and grounds of Christian Doctrine with a view to demonstrating the extent of existing agreement within the Church of England and with a view to investigating how far it is possible to remove or diminish existing differences.

We note and approve your proposal that the Report of the Commission should not be an authoritative statement, but that it should, when prepared, be laid before the Bishops for them to consider what further action (if any) should be taken.

I am,
Yours very truly,
RANDALL CANTUAR.

LIST OF THOSE SUGGESTED AS MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

The Bishop of Oxford.
The Bishop of Manchester.
The Dean of Bristol.
The Rev. F. R. Barry.
The Rev. Preb. E. J. Bicknell.
The Rev. J. M. Creed.
The Rev. Canon J. R. Darbyshire.
The Rev. C. W. Emmet.
The Rev. H. B. Gooding.
The Rev. L. W. Grensted.
The Rev. W. L. Knox.
The Rev. Prof. W. R. Matthews.
Professor W. Moberly.
The Rev. J. K. Mozley.
The Rev. Canon O. C. Quick.
The Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson.
The Rev. E. G. Selwyn.
The Rev. C. J. Shebbeare.
W. Spens, Esq.
The Rev. Canon V. F. Storr.
The Rev. Canon B. H. Streeter.
Professor A. E. Taylor.
The Rev. L. S. Thornton.
Professor C. C. J. Webb.
The Rev. Canon M. Albert Wilson.

REVIEW

LATIN HYMNS*

DR. MASON has laid us all under an obligation by the publication of the work of his friend and fellow-scholar, Mr. A. S. Walpole. The book is divided into two equal parts—hymns by well-known authors from the fourth to the sixth century, and anonymous hymns from the earlier and later service-books—some of the compositions, however, dating from a period anterior to the books in which they were enshrined. Very great pains have been taken in textual criticism and in tracing

* Early Latin Hymns, with Introduction and Notes, by the late A. S. Walpole, M.A. Edited by A. J. Mason, D.D., Canon of Canterbury. Cambridge University Press, 1922.

the appearance of the hymns in different MSS. and service-books; the work, indeed, must have been prodigious, and has been conducted with the meticulous care we are accustomed to expect from Cambridge scholarship. And besides textual criticism, the copious notes on the subject-matter, the Biblical references, the patristic parallels, and the Latinity, are quite beyond anything attempted before. No future student of Latin hymnology can afford to neglect the book. Mr. Walpole and his editor have gathered together what they consider the finest specimens, and their collection has the merit of provoking thought and compelling judgments. What is the test to be applied to a hymn as distinct from mere sacred poetry? We think that these hundred and twenty-seven examples will help us to some decision.

It has been remarked that few poets are good hymn-writers, and the reason is that the poet finds it difficult to restrain his imagination. A hymn differs from a sacred poem in that it is meant to be sung, and sung by a congregation of widely different mental calibres. It must, therefore, be simple in thought and couched in simple though stately language. No. 124, *Decus sacrati nominis*, clearly transgresses this rule.* Again, Prudentius was the Father of Christian poetry, but his work as it stands is quite unsuitable for hymnody. What the old redactors did was to compose hymns out of his poems. To give an example, Mr. Walpole calls attention to the fact that "this beautiful hymn (*Salvete flores martyrum*) is patched together from Prudentius' *hymnus epiphaniæ* and has gained by its abbreviation. The lines selected are in the original—125-128, 134, 129, 130, 132, 93, 94, 97, 99, 101, 102, 107-112, 117, 114, 113, 115, 133, 137, 138, 136." Thus Prudentius can hardly be called a hymn-writer; rather he provided the rich material out of which hymns could be constructed.

An example of the difference between a hymn and a poem is given in the compositions of Venantius Fortunatus, *Pange lingua*, and *Vexilla regis*—are not these hymns at the very summit of excellence? Has even Ambrose reached so high? But *Tempora florigero* (Hymn 36 in the collection), though a beautiful poem, is not a successful hymn, and it is to be remembered that Fortunatus never intended it to be a hymn.

We venture to suggest two other canons of the art of hymn-writing. Hymns should avoid giving information and, secondly, the *oratio recta* should be rarely used. Ambrose, with all his excellence, affords instances of what should be eschewed. Hymn 12 has a line in the fifth stanza which lets

* Some years ago the writer, having found this hymn in a collection of poetry under the name of Damasus, tried his hand at a translation. He decided, first, that it was far beyond his power to put it into intelligible English verse, secondly, that it was not worth the effort, and, thirdly, that it was not by Damasus, a conclusion confirmed by Mr. Walpole and his authorities.

us down with a thud—*Seuerus est nomen viro*. It reminds one faintly of the terrible lines in the hymn for St. Bartholomew in Hymns A. and M.: "Was it he beneath the fig-tree seen of thee . . . ? None can tell us." In Hymn 14 we get:

"uersate me," martyr uocat,
"uorate, si coctum est," jubet.

The use of the *oratio recta* sadly mars the dignity of an Ambrosian hymn. But there is another reason why it is unsuitable to hymnody; when the words are *sung* they become almost ludicrous.

Æternus rerum conditor, *Splendor paternæ gloriæ*, *Æterna Christi munera*, etc., in all nineteen hymns, pass in stately procession through Mr. Walpole's pages. He calls attention to many a beautiful passage—for instance, in the Easter hymn No. 10:

Quid hoc potest sublimius,
ut culpa quærat gratiam
metumque soluat caritas
reddatque mors vitam nouam.

hamum sibi mors deuoret
suisque se nodis liget,
moriatur ut uita omnium,
resurgat ut uita omnium.

"A pointed contrast of life and death" with a "splendid climax," Mr. Walpole says. It is difficult to bring anything into comparison with Ambrose at his best, but the *hamum* irresistibly recalls a stanza by Adam of St. Victor:

Sic hamum divinitatis occultat mortalitas,
Sic voracis Leviathan luditur voracitas;
Qui dum capit, glutiendum, nostri vermem generis
Ipse captus inescatur. Pax est data posteris.

What a dramatic composition to found on the theme: "Canst thou draw out Leviathan with an hook ?"! And what perfect form, not a word too much or too little! The twelfth century runs the fourth very close.*

Mr. Walpole gives the pretty hymn on St. Agatha, but says "it is vulgarized by its obtrusive rhymes." This seems the point at which to say something about the Latinity of the hymns. By what standard are we to judge them? By the rules of classical syntax and prosody?

Here we confess to parting company with the Cambridge scholars, with the more confidence that we have the support of Trench. Mr. Walpole's analysis of the hymns, pointing out the growing disregard of the rules of prosody, his remarks on elision and hiatus, show his standpoint. But surely Trench was right; we have to deal with a new language. The vigorous outpouring of the Christian heart refused to be bound by the fetters of a dead past; the hymn-writers had a new and glorious

* One feels, too, that in true mediæval spirit Adam is revelling in the jest at the expense of the arch-deceiver: "You were nicely landed, weren't you!"

message to mankind, and a new and virile Latinity sprang from the written language of the Golden Age.* Ambrose departed but little from prosodical Latin; one feels that his unquestionable excellence was in spite, not because of his adhesion to classical rules, largely artificial and imposed upon Latin from without. Why trouble about quantity in hymns written for the people when accent is what appeals most strongly to the ear of man? If the great Latin poets of the early and later Middle Ages had not freed themselves from pedantry their songs and hymns would have been as lifeless as the Latin translations of well-known English hymns contributed by Mr. Gladstone, and lesser scholars, to the columns of the *Guardian*—clever recreations, but nothing more. Does anybody to-day read the classical compositions of Sidonius Apollinaris, of which the poor man was so proud? *Media et infima latinitas* is a new scion from an ancient root, a living and not a dead language to those who wrote in it. And why stumble at rhyme? Are we to condemn one of the most powerful methods of appeal to the human heart? Would it be a real reform if all our English hymns were written in blank verse? And if in other languages rhyme has such a fascinating influence why not in Latin, a language in which rhyme comes almost naturally? Nobody, we suppose, would question that the—

> Mihi est propositum in taberna mori,
> Vinum sit appositum morientis ori

of the disgraceful archdeacon is a better drinking-song than anything that has come down from classical times; the verses at Trimalchio's feast are as dull as ditch-water, and the Bacchic odes of Horace, in a tuneful metre, are few. Catullus gives a chorus, but not to a drinking-song, and *Ad pincernam suum* looks difficult for gentlemen in their cups. But it may be urged that rhyme detracts from the dignity of lofty themes. The *Dies iræ* is sufficient refutation:

> Tuba, mirum spargens sonum,
> Per sepulchra regionum,
> Coget omnes ante thronum.

"The solemn effect of the triple rhyme, which has been likened to blow following blow on the anvil."

At the end of the book Dr. Mason gives a very useful compilation from Walpole's incomplete grammatical notes on Middle Latin and an Index of Words. By the way, might not more have been said about *corpusculum* in the original version of *Ad cœnam agni providet?* In late Latin, as in its descendant Italian, the diminutive is used in an affectionate sense. It means here, "Whose dear Body." ATHELSTAN RILEY.

* How far this written language differed from the vernacular and its relations to the Latin of the early authors is a subject too long to discuss here. Trench treats of it very fully in the Introduction to his *Sacred Latin Poetry*.

NOTICES

A Travers Trois Siècles: L'œuvre des Bollandistes, 1615-1915. Hippolyte Delehaye, S.J. Bruxelles, 1920.

"It was at Rome, on the 15th of October, 1764, as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol, while the bare-footed fryars were singing vespers in the Temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the Decline and Fall of the City first started to my mind. It was on the day, or rather night, of the 27th of June, 1787, between the hours of eleven and twelve, that I wrote the last lines of the last page, in a summer-house in my garden."

In these famous words Gibbon tells the history of his vast project and we wonder at the greatness of his achievement. What then shall we say of the Bollandists? In 1615 Rosweyde published the *Vitæ Patrum*, out of which the *Acta Sanctorum* afterwards grew. In 1643 two enormous volumes appeared, containing the Lives of Saints commemorated in January. In 1910 the third volume of November was published, comprising days 5 to 8. A tiny band of scholars is still at work and the end is not yet. The records of scholarship provide no parallel to Fr. Delehaye's epic, which describes how a few Belgian Jesuits began to write the history of that great multitude which no man can number and thereby lit a fire which has burned ever since.

There are four main stages in the undertaking. First the great days of Bollandus and Papebroch. These men and their collaborators were pioneers in a trackless forest, blazing a trail for others to follow. Historical method as understood to-day was unknown. The wildest legends did duty for historical truth. To doubt, for example, that the Carmelites originated with Elijah was rank impiety. The Bollandists had to tour Europe for information, copy manuscripts on a large scale, make endless lists and indices, and invent systems of classifying and filing material. The second period, in the eighteenth century, saw a slackening of output and a dulling of the fine edge of scholarship. The revolutionary disturbances at the end of the century stopped the work and scattered the library, the treasures of which were irretrievably lost. In 1837 the third stage began, and from 1845 onwards successive volumes of October carried on the series from the point at which it had ceased in the eighteenth century. The last stage began with the call of Fr. de Smedt to Brussels in 1876 to take charge of the work. He recognized that modern historical science demanded a complete remodelling of plan. Accurate texts were an essential foundation of good work and the libraries of Europe, now accessible through printed catalogues, had to be ransacked for their treasures. He resolved to finish October after the old manner and start afresh with November. The Bollandists to-day have an international reputation for severely accurate scholarship. Their subsidiary publications are numerous and their magazine *Analecta Bollandiana* reaches a standard of excellence which it would be impertinent to praise.

The ramifications of hagiology are endless, especially when the cult of the saints is included in the search. Textual criticism, folk-lore, liturgiology, "diplomatic," and a host of ancillary sciences have to be studied. No one to-day would use the Calendar as a basis upon which

to start such a work. But the original choice has been abundantly justified by the event. To attack the problem thus piecemeal was the only possible way in the seventeenth century, and even to-day has many advantages. The saints commemorated in November and December represent many different lands and times, and so every part of the field gets the advantage of the better historical methods of the twentieth century.

Two reflections occur to one reader at least as he lays down the book. In the first place, how well the Papacy comes out of the story. Rome was not always favourable—the continued discrediting of pious opinions sanctified by time and use made that too much to expect—but was singularly loth to condemn. Secondly, one reflects how little the Church of England with her great resources of learning and leisure has to put by the side of the Belgian Jesuits. Is it too late to plan a company of English Bollandists? Scholarship is international and undenominational, but one field at least belongs by right to the Church of England—her own history. No history of English Christianity exists worthy of the name. The charming volumes of Hunt and Stephens' series dispense with references and cannot satisfy the real need. This would be one of the tasks of the proposed Society. Many others will occur to the reader. As to ways and means: there are the libraries of Lambeth, Sion College, and the Cathedrals; there are Canonries at Cathedrals, City churches, learned scholars—far more resources are available to us than to the seventeenth-century Jesuits. What we lack is the driving power of a master-purpose, the subordination of individual wills to a common object, and the conviction that learning has any real part to play in the Kingdom of God.

W. K. L. Clarke.

Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition. Bishop Paddock Lectures, 1922. By Oliver Chase Quick. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Quick is a Catholic who is also philosophically minded and philosophically trained. As a Catholic he defines the essence of Christianity as a fellowship of souls on earth and in the beyond who are permeated and penetrated by the Godhead. This intimate union of God with man "finds not only its supreme revealer, but its sacramental embodiment and its effective agent in Jesus Christ as at once the Prophet, the Herald, and the crucified and risen Head of the Christian fellowship." From this definition of "essential orthodoxy" he gains a criterion by which to judge the adequacy of the theology of Liberal Protestantism, of Catholic Modernism, and of Traditionalism. He finds Liberal Protestantism unsatisfactory because it appears to confuse the natures of God and man, thus blurring the distinction of nature which Catholic experience demands and which the facts of the Gospel assume. Modernist Catholicism is unsatisfactory because, having accepted the fact of evolution within Christianity, it possesses no criterion by which it can judge how far this development is true or false. Traditional Christology, while guarding the essence of Christian experience, fails adequately to express the penetration of the manhood of Christ by the Godhead, and tends to bring together the Godhead and the manhood without making any real attempt to combine them. It is at this point that the author turns philosopher. He claims that modern philosophy can "suggest a point of view from which we may regard the Divine and human natures

as distinct without being separate. If this is so, modern thought supplies a lack which centuries of Christian theology have felt." He works out this claim in the last two lectures. The book deserves to be widely read.

E. C. Hoskyns.

Dogmatic Theology. Vol. X., Eschatology and Indexes. By F. J. Hall, D.D., Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the General Theological Seminary, New York City. Pp. xiii+318. Longmans. 1922. 9s.

We are not acquainted with Dr. Hall's earlier works, and it is, therefore, not very easy for us to express a definite opinion upon this the concluding volume of the series. It is evidently the fruit of much labour and of wide reading, though the author does not seem to be at much pains to discriminate between the value of any of the works to which he refers. It is, for example, rather surprising to find Herbert Spencer cited as a first-rate authority. And most scholars on this side of the Atlantic would find fault with the Biblical exegesis in more than one place; *e.g.*, on p. 238 Apoc. x. 6 is treated as evidence of the non-existence of time in the spiritual world, though the marginal reading of the R.V. is noted.

If, as we rather imagine to be the case, it was Dr. Hall's object to produce a convenient summary of New Testament teaching on certain points, together with the opinions of a considerable selection of writers, ancient and modern, he must be considered to have been successful. And his book should be extremely valuable as a promptuary for unlearned teachers. But regarded as a contribution to religious thought, it adds little or nothing to knowledge which is already fairly widely diffused amongst us. We should have thought it difficult to treat the subjects with which this book deals without at least some reference to Platonism. But we have not noticed anything in these pages which would suggest that Plato and his successors ever existed. There is a copious bibliography at the end.

R. H. Malden.

[We are reluctant to interfere with the prerogative of a valued reviewer to speak his mind about a book submitted to him. But the verdict given above seems to do far less than justice to Dr. Hall's great achievement. To produce an Anglican *Summa* has been the task of a lifetime, and his fellow-Churchmen all over the world salute him. The concluding volume of the series seems to us of exceptional value. Rarely, if ever, has the traditional teaching of the Church been presented in so persuasive and attractive a guise.—Ed.]

Human Character. By Hugh Elliot. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Hugh Elliot has written an interesting book, partly because he has started an enormous number of hares—which is always stimulating—and partly because, although we knew that most of these hares were lying in their forms here and there throughout the countryside, there are many of them which we have never seen running. This suggests that there is nothing particularly original in what he writes, with perhaps one exception, and that is the chapter concerning what Mr. Elliot felici-

tously terms "Bovarysm," which chapter is, we venture to think, the best in the book. Under this heading the author gives us a series of vignettes based upon the model of Flaubert's "Madame Bovary," vignettes in which we recognize admirable portraits of not a few of our friends and—let us be honest—surely of ourselves also.

Mr. Elliot would not, we imagine, disclaim his debt to Freud, and what we get is, as it were, a Freudian handbook. We are told of the constant quantity of emotional energy, diffusing itself variously throughout the various departments of what is understood to be human character, the particular blend presented in each concrete instance being largely dependent upon environmental stimulus. We learn that the stuff, the raw material, of the blend is derived from heredity; that, however considerably this stuff may be modified by environment, the result is no more than modification, for "a man's constitution, physical and mental, is almost entirely determined by heredity"; and, finally, that, whatever modification there may be, its effect is never sufficiently impressive upon character as to constitute a deposit to be handed down to posterity. Where then, we may venture to ask, does evolution come in? What room is left for that action or reaction of the objective and the subjective which some of us supposed that the word "life" in its most comprehensive sense connoted?

We have, too, each with a chapter to itself, the three primary emotions —the egoistic, the sexual, and the social—with the doctrine of their mutual transmutation, as well as that of the discovery in all sorts of out-of-the-way places, in particular in religion, of the energy of sexual emotion. "Sexual sentiments are deeply rooted in the religious emotion"; in fact, religion, although admitted to be founded upon the "triple basis" of egoism, sex, and morals—and by morals Mr. Elliot would seem to mean social emotion—"is largely a transmuted sex impulse." And here we would point out that Mr. Elliot, while insisting that ethics "do not fall within the province" of his book, does from time to time use terms which suggest the identity of moral with social emotion; indeed, the chapter dealing with the third primary emotion is entitled "Social and Moral Feeling," the implication throughout being that antisocial actions are morally wrong and that law, the "concrete expression of social instinct," is morally right, as is righteous indignation, taking effect in such acts as lynching and the like, the language of this instinct in primitive communities in which law is not codified. Here we are brought up against the question of determinism, which is a theory, not of what *ought to be*, but of what *is*. Ruskin regarded the criminal as a manufactured article, but he scarcely would have allowed the product to be inevitable; with Mr. Elliot "the criminal is merely the inevitable outcome of heredity and environment." The vindictive sentiments exhibited by society when provoked by crime are equally inevitable, and such vindictive sentiments are transmuted moral sentiments. Thus both the crime and the penalty are, from the scientific standpoint, determined; and when Mr. Elliot states that, from the moral standpoint, the crime *ought not* to have been committed or *ought* to be punished, one is tempted to ask "Why?"

The whole horizon is so filled by emotion that plainly intellect, in the sense of a faculty possessing a distinctive quality of its own, as being something *sui generis* as compared with all other human endowments, is ruled out. "Thought is itself an emotion," but—and the qualification seems to unsay the sentence—"it has scarcely any driving energy";

its function is to discriminate. Now, do not emotions, *stricte dictæ*, essentially *drive*, and do they ever *discriminate?*

Religion would appear to be a derived emotion, a transmuted amalgam of the three primary emotions—the egoistic, the sexual, and the social—which in varying proportions are always present. How then is dogma "the essential feature of religion"? Mr. Elliot quotes the following exhortation addressed to a monk by an eighth-century abbot: "Rather than abstain from adoring Christ and His mother in their holy images it would be better for you to enter every brothel and visit every prostitute in the city." This to show that sexual levity—indeed, moral delinquency in general—is a secondary consideration in religion as compared with offence against doctrine. The chapter and verse of this quotation ought to have been given; nay, we ought to know, not merely the context of the words, but the circumstances under which they were spoken. Two other quotations of a character similarly damaging to religion occur in the book: "A cruel unfeeling temper has distinguished the monks of every age and country." And again: "Whenever the spirit of fanaticism, at once so credulous and so crafty, has insinuated itself into a noble mind, it insensibly corrodes the vital principles of virtue and veracity." We should like to know to whom we are indebted for these *dicta*. Presumably, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Bernard, St. Vincent de Paul, and a thousand others, were fanatics; for "fanatics are the people who make the world move," and a fanatic mind "exhibits a tropical abundance of feeling in one part, and is a barren desert in other parts"; whether they were, therefore, "credulous" and "crafty," and their "principles of virtue and veracity" corroded—well, *securus iudicat orbis terrarum*, and we are not sure that on this point Mr. Elliot is not "at cross-purposes with the world," the victim of an *accès* of Bovarysm! Ἰατρέ, θεράπευσον σεαυτόν.

Another indication of this malady is, we venture to think, the tendency to write classicized English. A certain number of new scientific and philosophical terms are always arriving in these days, but to explain the familiar proverb, "Barking dogs do not bite," by saying that "If the animal dissipates its hostile energy in latration, it has no longer sufficient to inspire it to morsure," is staggering; it is a kind of inverted schoolboy's "howler." A well-known assistant of Dr. Holden, of Ipswich School, was wont to be intolerant of the poor familiar word "stomach." "Speak Saxon, sir," he would roar at the offender; "say 'belly.'" Very respectfully we commend this injunction to Mr. Elliot. And with that we thank him for his book; it is stimulating and suggestive. As a study of human character, as a basis of casuistry, it ought to be really valuable to the priest, for, whether or not we be but a *congeries* of emotions and nothing else, the emotions count, and always have counted, for a great deal more than they are credited with, and of all disorders there is none so complicated and so obstinate as the emotional.

WATKIN WILLIAMS.

RELIGION AND BIOLOGY. E. E. Unwin, M.Sc. 1922. Swarthmore Press. 6s.

In this book the author has "attempted to outline the biological approach to the questions of religious thought." The greatest difficulty, of course, is that those whose lives are spent in biological research tend to speak and think in another language to those whose interests are with

Theology in its stricter sense; but it is just for this reason that books such as this have their value. The author begins by outlining the general outlook on the world of life which the modern biologist adopts, and in the second chapter he comes out strongly on the side of Hans Driesch and the later vitalists. This, in the reviewer's opinion, is a pity, for the recent advances in biophysics and biochemistry alone point clearly to a mechanistic view of all the attributes of physical life, including growth.

There are many sides to this venerable dichotomy of opinion, but from its history there emerges one fact at least which is definite. Ever since the earliest attempts to apply physics and chemistry to living matter, such as those of Borelli and Sanctorius, the successes of vitalism in its various forms have all been negative. Step by step its supporters have been driven back from their more advanced positions, now by a chemist, as when Wöhler synthesized urea in vitro; now by physicists, as when Atwater and Benedict proved that the law of the Conservation of Energy held for the animal body. A recent example is to be seen in the question as to whether the human lung-epithelium secretes or filters oxygen. The vitalist, or neo-vitalist, supporters of the former view had eventually to admit that if secretion took place at all it was only under circumstances of exceptional stress. The strength of vitalism lies in its negation of possibility, but, as has happened before now, negation may prove rather a weakness than a strength. In this connection the author hopes that the gap between life and non-life may some day be bridged; and it is not easy to reconcile this with anything but the most neo- of neo-vitalisms. He supports the view that the morphogenetic entelechy of Driesch is the precursor of consciousness and intelligence. But what needs stressing to-day is that the mechanistic conception of physical life is in no way incompatible with the author's admirable religious standpoints. Idealism in biology has been yoked with vitalism already far too long.

Perhaps the Problem of Evil in Chapter V. might have been treated a little more fully, but to have expected any new light on that *pièce-de-résistance* of biological philosophy would have been optimistic indeed. The author includes a vigorous condemnation of the unbiological view that "war is a biological necessity."

Throughout the main part of the book he is dealing with subjects more fundamental than those on which Christians are divided. But in the last chapter he touches on the Sacramental nature of things, and argues against the Sacramental system of the Church, in so far as it is held to be man's normal means of Grace.

Mr. Unwin has said nothing new, but he has said the older things extremely well and has clearly summarized the subject. Anything which helps to bridge the gap between the religious thinker and the worker in the laboratory merits the warmest welcome.

N. J. T. M. Needham, O.G.S.

The Westminster History of England. By Ralph Tanner, M.A., late Senior Master, Westminster School. London: The Sheldon Press. 1922. Price 6s.

Mr. Tanner's book contains the history of England in 215 pages of text. It is easy to see, therefore, that the work is not written on a very large scale. The book, indeed, pretends to be no more than a school textbook; but it is intended to be so written that Westminster boys shall

"learn from the history of England more of the history of the Abbey and the School than can be gained from ordinary histories."

This is, we think, an excellent idea. But we cannot say quite so much for the execution of it, for in so small a book on so great a subject he has really scarcely had a chance of saying a hundredth part of what he might have said about Westminster. He has, indeed, at the end of nearly every reign given two or three paragraphs to the abbey and to the school; he has added two appendices on Old Westminsters buried in the abbey, and on the abbey's architecture; and he has illustrated the volume with excellent photographs of the effigies of our kings and queens, either taken from their tombs or from the abbey's waxen figures; and this last feature, especially, is a delightful and valuable one. But on the whole we feel that Mr. Tanner would have done far more for Westminster boys, and others, if he had written "A Westminster Supplement to the History of England," or some such volume as should make England's history be seen from, and through, Westminster, instead of actually giving only an occasional glance at Westminster while writing the history of England from—anywhere or from nowhere, as far as any distinctive note or point of view is to be found in this book.

At the end of each chapter, however, he also adds a list of historical novels, and this he has done with care and knowledge. But how we wish that Mr. Tanner's book had been wholly about Westminster and historical novels! There are already so many historians of England ("Scriberis Vario . . .," he might have said); and we ourselves believe that English or any other history can only be easily understood if read in big works which contain atmosphere and explain facts. Small textbooks, no doubt, have their uses also. But they are for the advanced historians who, amidst the mazes of their sublime speculations, feel the need sometimes of a book of reference to tell them the date of Queen Elizabeth's death.

H. F. V. SOMERSET.

SERMONS.

In the Footprints of the Master, by J. H. B. Masterman (S.P.C.K., 2s. 6d.). The newly consecrated Bishop of Plymouth gives very full and careful sermon outlines on St. Mark, which can be worked up by the preacher in his own way. They are excellently adapted for courses on the life of our Lord. *Fifty-Six Short Sermons*, by the Bishop of Willochra (S.P.C.K., 6s. 6d.), are each calculated to take fifteen minutes when read deliberately. They are intended in the first instance to be read by Australian lay readers, in some dioceses exceeding priests in number, who are authorized to conduct services, but not to proclaim the Church's faith in their own words. But their chief value in England is for devotional reading on the part of those debarred from attending church. *No More War, and Other Sermons*, by W. E. Orchard (Allen and Unwin, 5s.), is a further selection of sermons preached at the King's Weigh House Church. Some were chosen because those who heard them liked them; others because they were not liked. *Fight the Good Fight*, by W. E. Frost (S.P.C.K., 6s.), stands out from the host of sermon literature by reason of its distinctive flavour. It is a collection of short addresses given by the lay headmaster of a preparatory school in Scotland. Within their limits they are very good, and as the writer has passed away it can be said without hesitation that they reveal a beautiful character.

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